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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent regimes of control rights over critical resources on the
total domestic income of open economies. We consider home control, foreign control, and
international partnerships in a theoretical model where contracts are incomplete, resource
exploitation requires local capital, and foreign technologies are more e¢ cient. Enacting for-
eign control is never optimal, and assigning complete residual rights to foreign rms reduces
domestic income. Two testable predictions are derived. First, international partnerships
tend to generate higher domestic income than foreign control. Second, the typical regime
choice is either partnership or foreign control when the international relative protability
of the domestic resource endowment is high or intermediate, and home control with low
relative protability. We test these predictions using a new dataset on petroleum ownership
structures for up to 68 countries between 1867-2008, nding strong empirical support for
the theoretical results.
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1 Introduction
In a world with costly transactions and incomplete contracts, the allocation of control rights over
productive assets inuences the size and the distribution of the gains from economic activity, and
directly a¤ects the incentives for agents to invest. From this perspective, who has control over
the exploitation of critical resources e.g., essential primary inputs is a crucial determinant of
economic performance, especially in developing countries richly endowed with natural wealth.1
In this paper, we investigate the causes and consequences of di¤erent regimes of control rights
over the exploitation of primary resources. Our analysis has four distinctive features. First, we
look beyond the conventional division between private and public ownership and instead focus
on domestic, foreign, and mixed international partnership forms of control rights regimes.
Second, control rights regimes are the outcome of bargaining between exploiting rms and the
State, which is the de jure owner of the resource stock.2 Third, we study how di¤erent control
regimes inuence the aggregate income of a resource-rich economy when the primary sector
coexists with, and withdraws rival inputs from, non-primary sectors. Fourth, we address this
issue at both the theoretical and empirical levels, testing the predictions of the model on a new
dataset on petroleum control rights structures.
Situations of substantial foreign control over strategic primary resources are quite common
in todays globalized world. Considering a representative sample of sixty-four oil-producing
economies in 2005, we observe that domestic control is the dominant property structure in
only nine countries: foreign control and international partnerships prevail in the vast majority
of cases  twenty-four and thirty-one countries, respectively.3 Standard economic reasoning
suggests that technological gaps play a fundamental role in the rise of foreign-control regimes
or international partnerships. Countries that discover new stocks of natural resources often
lack the technological know-how necessary to exploit these endowments, and the foreign rms
operating abroad in the sector of interest are typically more e¢ cient than yet-to-be-established
domestic enterprises. In this scenario  which most likely but not exclusively arises in less
developed economies the resource-rich country may gain from assigning full or partial control
rights to foreign rms: the natural endowment is exploited with the most e¢ cient technology
and generates additional domestic income as the foreign rm pays concession fees and royalties.
The ip side of enacting foreign control is that the residual prots reaped from resource
exploitation are repatriated and potentially re-invested abroad. A recent OECD study shows
that, in low-income countries, foreign rms prot remittances exceeded new foreign direct
investment (FDI) inows in every year between 1999-2005 a pattern which is especially strong
during periods of economic crisis, when parent companies tend to repatriate nancial resources
to strengthen their balance sheet (Mold et al. 2009). More generally, foreign-based rms have
1 In this paper, we distinguish between property and control rights: the former regards basic ownership rights,
while the latter includes access, exploitation and investment rights, which can be assigned independently of basic
ownership of an asset. The link between property rights and economic development is the subject of a growing
body of literature. An excellent discussion of the main ideas is Besley and Gathak (2010).
2The United Nations General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December, 1962 (on Permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources) grants The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources, a concept that is echoed in most countriesconstitutions. Given this basic assign-
ment of ownership over natural resources to the State, the salient question becomes who has the right to exploit
these resources, or alternatively: who has access to and control over the resource.
3See Section 5 below for a detailed description of sources and methods.
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little interest in raising domestic welfare in the host country as this is beyond the scope of their
prot-maximization obligation towards shareholders (Vrankel, 1980; Onorato, 1995).
Building on these considerations, we construct a model in which the technological di¤erences
between domestic and foreign rms, and the asymmetric objectives pursued by foreign rms
and the State(i.e., the authority assigning exploitation rights over domestic resources), are
explicit determinants of the surplus generated by primary production under di¤erent regimes.
We consider a small open economy where a newly discovered natural resource endowment can be
exploited to produce a tradeable commodity. Producing the commodity also requires the use
of local capital withdrawn from the pre-existing traditional sector. In this setup, control rights
include (i) the rights of access to the resource endowment, to produce and sell the commodity;
(ii) the rights to choose the level of investment; and (iii) the residual rights of control over
the local capital. The State considers three possible regimes: Home Control, which assigns
all control rights to a domestic enterprise; Foreign Control, which assigns all control rights
to a foreign rm endowed with the most productive technology; or creating an international
Partnership involving mixed control, where the foreign rm provides the best technology and
the State provides local capital. The prots from commodity production are shared according to
Nash Bargaining, and the regime of control rights a¤ects equilibrium outcomes for two reasons.
First, residual rights over local capital are a source of bargaining power because investment
levels are not contractible ex-ante (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Second,
the impact of residual rights on investment incentives is asymmetric because the parties aim
at di¤erent targets: while the foreign rm maximizes its share of ex-post prots, the State
maximizes total domestic income taking into account the reallocation e¤ects induced by the
shifting of local capital from traditional to commodity production.4
We analyze two variants of the model by considering alternative ways in which local capital
is transferred to domestic rms in the event of bargaining breakdown under Foreign Control.
In the rst variant, the State conscates the foreign rms local capital. In the second variant,
the State is credibly committed to compensate (part of) the initial investment cost so that
the foreign rm has (partial) residual rights. Both circumstances are empirically plausible:
conscation characterized several processes of nationalization (Guriev et al., 2011); but partial
or complete State repurchase, including forms of compensation such as preferential access for
the formally expropriated rms, is not a rare event either (Philip, 1994). Remarkably, both
versions of the model show that Partnership can be jointly optimal whereas Foreign Control
cannot. Another interesting result is that the State should not assign complete residual rights
over local capital to the foreign rm because this would generate massive crowding-out in the
traditional sector and thereby lower domestic income: the ideal degree of residual rights always
lies between the polar cases of conscationand complete repurchase.
Besides these results, the main insights that we draw from the theoretical model are two
testable predictions. First, in most parametrizations, Partnership yields higher domestic income
4The maximization of national income and pursuit of national interest is often mentioned as a reason for
greater state involvement in a crucial sector. For example, Kobrin (1984) traces the evolution of petroleum
sector control rights from mostly foreign control to increasing participation (right up to nationalization) by
host-country governments as "the perception that foreign investors could not be trusted to develop resources
in the national interest became widespread" (ibid., p. 146). In her case study, Randall (1987) describes how
the "remarkably high rate of repatriation of prots [by foreign oil rms] from Venezuela" (ibid., .21) led to
a decades-long series of negotiations over rent distribution that culminated in the 1976 nationalization of the
petroleum industry.
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than Foreign Control. Second, the typical regime choice is either Partnership or Foreign control
when the international relative protability of the domestic resource endowment is high or
intermediate, and Home Control with low relative protability.
In order to test these theoretical predictions, we consider the petroleum sector. Oil is an
important economic resource, and it is found in a large number of countries in di¤erent regions
and at di¤erent stages of development, making a comparison particularly relevant. Collecting
data from a variety of primary and secondary sources, we present a large new dataset on
control rights regimes and national incomes for up to 68 oil-producing countries, starting as
early as 1867 and extending to 2008 in up to 28 ve-year periods. The empirical results from
xed-e¤ects panel data estimations conrm the rst prediction that Partnership leads to higher
national income than Foreign Control. In an extension of this prediction, we also nd that
both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher domestic income than Home Control
when we take into account the technology level. The results are strongly signicant and robust
to controlling for factors such as institutional quality, OPEC membership and time e¤ects.
Concerning the second prediction, the ndings from pooled multinomial logit estimations are
also in line with the models predictions: the more protable oil sectors tend to be under Foreign
Control or Partnership, while the least protable ones are likely to be domestically controlled.
We thus have remarkably strong empirical support for our theoretical results.
Our analysis is connected to di¤erent strands of literature. The role of residual control rights
as a source of bargaining power is a key insight of the modern theory of the rm pioneered by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). In this framework, several studies
analyzed private versus public provision of services (Hart et al., 1997), as well as private versus
government ownership of public projects (Besley and Ghatak, 2001).5 We depart from these
contributions in many respects. Most importantly, our analysis abstracts from the issue of
public versus private control and we consider a bargaining problem in which the joint surplus is
not a public good.6 Rajan and Zingales (1998) study the problem of selecting and choosing the
number of managers to be granted access rights to critical inputs within a rm. Our analysis
di¤ers in that we consider a State which chooses between domestic and foreign technologies
under the hypothesis that foreign rms are more productive but will repatriate all residual
prots.7
The parallel literature specialized in resource economics typically also focuses on the conse-
quences of private versus public ownership for the productive e¢ ciency of primary sectors both
at the theoretical and the empirical levels (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1992; Megginson, 2005;
Wolf, 2009; Guriev et al., 2011). We depart from sectoral observations concerning e¢ ciency 
e.g., productivity in the oil industry and instead analyze the consequences of control regimes
5Hart et al. (1997) show that the private contractors incentive to reduce costs is too strong because he
ignores the adverse e¤ect on other non-contractible characteristics that matter for the government e.g., service
quality. Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that when the parties value the project di¤erently, ownership should lie
with the party with highest valuation regardless of who is the key investor and of other aspects of technology.
6 In our model, a government implementing Home Controlis actually indi¤erent between private and public
management: the absence of local market failures implies an e¢ cient allocation of local assets regardless of
whether the extractive rm is controlled by the State or by local households.
7The same di¤erence arises with respect to the recent literature studying the e¤ects of incomplete contracts in
the organization of production within multinational rms (Antràs, 2005). More generally, our analysis abstracts
from the problem of selecting a specic domestic (foreign) technology provider drawn from a given set of domestic
(foreign) rms: each of the two technologies compared in our model can be interpreted as the most productive
(domestic and foreign) technology arising from a selection process that has already taken place.
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in the primary sector for the aggregate domestic income of resource-rich economies. In several
related studies from the political science eld, Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) have
long held that ownership structures are important when looking at the socio-economic impacts
of resource abundance, particularly petroleum and natural gas. We draw inspiration from their
work in the empirical part of this paper, but depart from their focus on public versus private
ownership and scal policy by performing a quantitative analysis of the relationship between
domestic versus foreign control and total domestic income in oil-rich countries.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Sections 3 and
4 characterize the equilibria under conscation and under credible repurchase, respectively.
Section 5 presents our empirical analysis and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
A small open economy, denoted by E, produces a tradable nal good Z henceforth referred
to as the traditional good and is endowed with a stock of natural wealth which consists of
a rival and excludable primary good (e.g., oil wells, mineral deposits) and can be exploited
to produce a commodity, denoted by X. Prior to the discovery of the natural endowment, the
economy only produces Z and the access rights over the resource are held by the agent State. As
domestic rms are initially specialized in Z-production, the economy has little knowledge of the
production process of commodity X which requires a specic technology for extraction and
processing as well as investment in local capital. In this environment, the State may implement
three di¤erent regimes of control rights i.e., rules dening the rights to exploit the resource
and sell the commodity, the rights to choose investment levels, and the residual rights over local
capital indexed by i = h; f; p . The rst option is to implement Home Control (i = h), that is,
assigning all control rights to a newly established domestic enterprise, which may be public or
private (see below). The second regime is Foreign Control (i = f), that is, assigning all control
rights to a specialized foreign rm upon payment of a license fee. Third, the State may create a
Partnership (i = p) in which the foreign rm provides the technology, exploits the resource and
sells the commodity while the State provides local capital: a public manager chooses investment
according to the States objective, which is to maximize total domestic income.
2.1 Markets and Technologies
Both the traditional good and the commodity are sold on competitive world markets at the
respective prices qz and qx, taken as given by each producer. Producing the commodity entails
to two types of cost. First, the owner of the processing technology i.e., the domestic manager
under Home Control, the foreign rm under Foreign Control or Partnership must pay a xed
start-up cost, denoted by si, which can be thought of as a technology-specic investment bearing
internal cost to the rm e.g., in-house R&D e¤ort. Importantly, the payment of si does not
imply any additional income for the residents of economy E. Second, the rm producing the
commodity must rent local capital, a rival input exclusively supplied by residents of country
E for example, land and rewarded at the interest rate r that prevails in the local market.
Local capital is internationally immobile but nationally mobile, being essential to produce the
traditional good as well as the commodity. Denoting by x and z the physical output levels of
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goods X and Z, we posit
xi  i (ki) and zi   (kmax   ki) ; i = h; f; p ; (1)
where kmax indicates the total endowment of local capital in economy E. The commodity
technology i () and the level of investment in the commodity sector, ki, are regime-contingent
whereas the technology of the traditional sector  () is independent of the control regime in
the commodity sector.8 Under Foreign Control and Partnership, the commodity sector uses
the same foreign technology, so that f () and p () are identical. Local capital exhibits
positive and strictly decreasing marginal productivity in commodity production, 0i (ki) > 0
and 00i (ki) < 0, a necessary assumption to have strictly positive prots for the foreign rm
under regimes i = (f; p). For good Z, we assume that  () displays constant returns to scale
so that the traditional sector can be represented as a unit mass of perfectly competitive rms
producing output
zi   (kmax   ki)    (kmax   ki) ; (2)
where  > 0. Perfect competition in the local market implies that capital will be rewarded at
the equilibrium rental rate
ri = qz   0 (kmax   ki) = qz (3)
as long as the traditional sector produces a positive quantity. We will assume that aggregate
capital kmax is su¢ ciently abundant to ensure an interior equilibrium 0 < ki < kmax under
any regime i = (h; f; p). Notice that the value of domestic income generated by the traditional
sector equals the total value of sectoral production, qzzi, whereas this is not always true for
the commodity sector: under Foreign Control and Partnership, part of the residual surplus
(qxxi   si) is appropriated by the foreign rm.
2.2 Cost Sharing
Under Home Control, the domestic rm pays the start-up cost sh, chooses the investment level
kh paying the associated rents rhkh, and produces the commodity using the domestic technology,
xh = h (kh). All the revenues in excess of the cost of in-house R&D e¤ort, qxxh  sh, become
additional income for residents. Under Foreign Control, the foreign rm pays the start-up cost
sf , chooses investment kf paying the associated rents rfkf , and produces the commodity using
the foreign technology xf = f (kf ), which is ceteris paribus more productive than the domestic
technology h (). From the perspective of a benevolent State, the advantage of Foreign Control
is that the commodity is produced more e¢ ciently. The drawback is that only a fraction of
the foreign rms revenues become domestic income: the foreign rm pays a license fee to the
State in order to obtain the concession but sends all residual gains back to its country of origin,
outside E. The level of the license fee, `f , is determined by bargaining between the State and
the foreign rm.
Under Partnership, the foreign rm provides the technology p () = f () and bears the
cost of in-house R&D, sp. The State provides local capital kp and pays the associated rents rpkp
8 In (1), we implicitly assume full utilization of local capital kmax between the traditional and the commodity
sectors. This is without loss of generality since our assumptions in sections 2 and 3 guarantee an interior
equilibrium in the allocation of local capital. The possibility of corner solutions is discussed in detail in the
extended model of section 4.
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using the proceeds from taxes imposed on domestic residents. The two parties then bargain over
the level of the license fee, `p, which determines the respective shares of prots from commodity
sales.
2.3 Productivity Di¤erences
Foreign Control and Partnership can be valid alternatives to Home Control only if the foreign
technology is ceteris paribus more e¢ cient, that is f (k
0) = p (k0) > h (k0) for any k0 > 0. In
general, we assume that the two technologies are identical up to a Hicks-neutral productivity
parameter implying that the foreign technology yields higher commodity output for a given
input level. When deriving more specic results that require a full analytical characterization
of equilibrium outcomes, we will use
xh  h (kh)  '1   kh with '1 > 0;
xi  i (ki)  '2   ki with '2 > '1 for i = (f; p) ;
(4)
where  2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of output to capital,  > 0 is a scale parameter representing a
country-specic characteristic e.g., the size of the domestic resource endowment and '2 and
'1 are productivity parameters implying that the foreign technology is ceteris paribus more
productive than the domestic technology.
2.4 Domestic Income and Firms Prots
Aggregate domestic income in the various regimes, Yi, is given by the expressions reported
in Table 1. Under Home Control, domestic income Yh equals aggregate domestic production
net of the start-up cost. The expressions for Yf and Yp clarify the di¤erence between Foreign
Control and Partnership. In both cases, the State exhibits balanced budget and rebates to
the households the license fee paid by the foreign rm via lump-sum transfers. Under Foreign
Control, residents also receive rfkf from the foreign rm whereas, under Partnership, the cost
of local investment rpkp is paid by the State and, hence, by residents via lump-sum taxes so
that the net domestic income generated by commodity production only consists of the license
fee, `p. Table 1 also reports the prots earned by the foreign rm in the various regimes: if the
State chooses Home Control, the foreign rm may produce outside economy E and earn the
reservation prot 0.
2.5 Behavioral Assumptions and Timing of Events
In any regime i, the foreign rm aims at maximizing prots i whereas the State aims at
maximizing aggregate domestic income Yi. Under Home Control, the State does not interact
with the foreign rm and the social problem has a fairly simple structure: there is no source
of ine¢ ciency and residents may enjoy the maximum level of income that the use of the do-
mestic technology allows to obtain (see section 2.7 below). Considering Foreign Control and
Partnership, the detailed timing of events is as follows:
Stage 0 (Regime choice). The State and the foreign rm sign a contract establishing which
regime i = (f; p) will be enforced. Investment levels ki are not contractible at this stage.
7
Regime Domestic income Foreign rms prots
Home Control Yh  qzzh + qxxh   sh 0
Foreign Control Yf  qzzf + rfkf + `f f  qxxf   sf   rfkf   `f
Partnership Yp  qzzp + `p p  qxxp   sp   `p
Table 1: Domestic income (Yi) and foreign rms prots (i) under alternative control regimes.
Stage 1 (Investment). The foreign rm pays si and the party in charge of local investment
chooses ki paying riki. Both si and riki are henceforth sunk and local capital ki is
henceforth xed: the traditional sector uses the residual amount kmax   ki to produce Z.
Stage 2 (Prot-Sharing Problem). The State and the foreign rm decide the level of the fee
`i according to Nash Bargaining, determining the respective shares of total prots from
commodity production qxf (kf )  sf   rfkf .
Stage 3 (Commodity Production). If the parties reach an agreement on prot-sharing at stage
2, the commodity is produced with the foreign technology xi = '2 k

i and the agreed
transfer `i is enforced. If bargaining at stage 2 breaks down with no agreement, economy
E produces the commodity using the domestic technology while the foreign rm operates
abroad.
A crucial assumption is that investment levels are non-contractible at Stage 0. Since both
parties anticipate that ki will a¤ect each partys bargaining power at Stage 2, the investor
will set ki at Stage 1 in order to maximize its overall payo¤. Control rights and residual
rights over local capital thus a¤ect the allocation, in line with Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990). However, di¤erently from standard cake-sharing problems, we
observe an important asymmetry between the overall payo¤s of the two parties (Yi and i)
and the bargaining payo¤s at Stage 2: the State aims at maximizing total domestic income,
not just the share of prots from commodity production. Also, we do not postulate a specic
bargaining procedure at Stage 0 to determine the initial regime choice. Instead, we characterize
the outcomes of di¤erent regimes studying whether, and under what circumstances, a given
regime is optimal and/or agreeable. The usefulness of this approach will become clearer in
section 3.3.
2.6 Bargaining and No-Trade Payo¤s at Stage 2
At Stage 2, the State and the foreign rm choose the level of license fee `i. We assume that the
prots from commodity production are shared according to the Nash bargaining solution, i.e.,
the parties split their renegotiation surplus 50/50 over the disagreement point. The bargaining
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payo¤s at Stage 2 for the State (Si) and foreign rm (Fi) under regime i are given by
Sf  `f and Ff  qxf (kf )  sf   rfkf   `f ;
Sp  `p   rpkp and Fp  qxp (kp)  sp   `p:
(5)
The disagreement point is identied by the respective no-trade payo¤s, that is, the payo¤s that
the parties receive if no agreement is reached at Stage 2 and bargaining breaks down. Since
ki is xed at Stage 1, and both the start-up cost si and the investment cost riki are sunk at
Stage 2, the no-trade payo¤s di¤er from the benets that the parties would get if the State
were to choose Home Control at Stage 0. Specically, the no-trade payo¤s are determined by
the following circumstances.
If negotiations break down, economy E can exploit the available capital ki by creating a new
domestic enterprise that produces the commodity using the domestic technology h (). This
is a source of bargaining power for the State which a¤ects both partiesinvestment decisions.
However, the rights to use ki after the breakdown are contingent on who holds the residual
control rights. Under Partnership, no transfer between foreign and domestic rms is needed:
the State already holds the rights on kp and transfers them to a domestic rm. Under Foreign
Control, instead, the foreign rm holds the rights but cannot use local capital outside economy
E so that kf must be transferred to domestic rms in some way. The rst possibility is that
the State conscates kf by exherting is power to set and enforce the local laws, in which case
the foreign rm has no residual control rights over local capital. The second possibility is
that the State is credibly commited to repurchase the rights on kf by paying the full (partial)
investment cost born by the foreign rm, in which case the foreign rm has complete (partial)
residual rights. We consider both scenarios since they are equally plausible reality. In the
present and in the next section, we analyze the case of conscation. Credible repurchase is
introduced in section 4.
Recalling that the economy E is subject to domestic start-up costs sh in the event of
bargaining breakdown, the no-trade payo¤s for the State, Di, and for the foreign rm, i,
respectively equal
Df  qxh (kf )  sh and Dp  qxh (kp)  sh;
f  0   sf   rfkf and p  0   sp:
(6)
The fact that local capital a¤ects no-trade payo¤s in both regimes implies that the party in
charge of investment can modify its own bargaining power at Stage 2 by choosing ki strategically
at Stage 1.
2.7 Home Control
While Foreign Control and Partnership require agreement between the State and the foreign
rm, the allocation arising under Home Control can be immediately characterized. The State
calculates the investment level that maximizes aggregate domestic income,
k?h  argmax fYh = qz (kmax   kh) + qxh (kh)  shg : (7)
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The solution is characterized by the standard e¢ ciency condition,
qx  0h (k?h) = qz   0 (kmax   k?h) = rh; (8)
which depicts a rst-best scenario where the marginal product of local capital matches its
marginal cost. The State may implement solution (8) in several ways. Provided that the
domestic rm producing the commodity acts as a price taker on the local input market, there is
no di¤erence between creating a State enterprise (that rebates all rents to residents via lump-
sum subsidies) and a private domestic rm (that maximizes prots taking rh as given): in either
case, the equilibrium in the market for local capital will guarantee equal marginal productivities
across sectors, and domestic residents will receive
Y ?h  qz (kmax   k?h) + qxh (k?h)  sh; (9)
which is the rst-best level of domestic income under Home Control. Indeed, when dening the
Home Control regime, we purposely avoided distinguishing between private and public domestic
enterprises: in the current setting, this characteristic does not matter for the results.9
3 Bargaining Equilibria
Under Foreign Control and Partnership, the State and the foreign rm share prots from com-
modity production according to Nash Bargaining. Solving the model backwards, we characterize
the solution to the prot-sharing problem (Stage 2), the investment strategies (Stage 1), and
the characteristics of optimality and feasibility that determine the initial regime choice (Stage
0).
3.1 Prot Sharing and Investment Strategies
At Stage 2, the State and the foreign rm agree on the level of transfers `Ni that maximizes the
Nash product
`Ni  argmax f(Si  Di)  (Fi  i)g for i = (f; p) : (10)
We assume that the parameter values are such that the Nash Bargaining solution yields strictly
positive gains so that the equilibrium outcome is ex-post e¢ cient.10 In the current problem,
the Nash bargaining solution, indicated by superscript N , yields the following levels of domestic
income and foreign rms prots for each regime i = (f; p):
Y Ni  qz (kmax   ki) +
1
2
 [qxi (ki)  si + riki] +
1
2
 (Di  i) ; (11)
Ni 
1
2
 [qxi (ki)  si   riki] 
1
2
 (Di  i) : (12)
9Under Home Control, the State has no incentive to impose a concession fee on domestic private rms: this
would introduce an un-necessary hold-up problem that conicts with the objective of maximizing total domestic
income. Under Foreign Control and Partnership, instead, the license fee is imposed because otherwise all the
residual prots from commodity production accruing to the foreign rm are repatriated abroad.
10The agreement yields strictly positive gains in regime i provided that the aggregate prots from commodity
production satisfy Si + Fi = qxi (ki)  si   riki > Di +i under regime i.
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At stage 1, the party in charge of the investment decision chooses ki anticipating the bargaining
outcomes (11)-(12). Under Foreing Control, the foreign rm chooses kf in order to maximize ex-
post prots Nf . Under Partnership, the State chooses kp in order to maximize ex-post domestic
income Y Np . Since the no-trade payo¤s (6) depend on investment levels, di¤erent regimes
yield di¤erent allocations of local capital. For the sake of generality, the following Proposition
summarizes the solution to the investment problem without using the specic technologies (2)
and (4): the conditions listed below hold in interior equilibria k?i 2 (0; kmax) under generic
well-behaved technologies i() and (). Denoting equilibrium values by superscript ?, we
have:
Proposition 1 Under Foreign Control, the foreign rm chooses k?f 2 (0; kmax) in order to
satisfy
qx  0f (k?f ) = 2  r?f| {z }
Double interest
+ qx  0h(k?f )| {z }
Bargaining power
: (13)
Under Partnership, the State chooses k?p 2 (0; kmax) in order to satisfy
qx  0p
 
k?p

= 2  qz 0
 
kmax   k?p
| {z }
Double interest
  qx  0h
 
k?p
| {z }
Bargaining power
  r?p|{z}
Residual rights
; (14)
which, given the equilibrium rental rate r?p = qz
0  kmax   k?p, implies
qx  0p(k?p) = r?p   qx  0h(k?p): (15)
Proposition 1 claries how both regimes depart from the rst-best allocation of local capital
characterized by the ideal condition qx0i(k
?
i ) = r
?
i . The rst element of distortion is the
non-contractibility of investment combined with prot sharing: the expectation of splitting
the revenues with the other party prompts the investor to rent an amount of capital yielding
a marginal benet equal to two times its marginal cost. This mechanism operates in both
regimes and implies the double-interest termsappearing in (13) and (14). The second element
of distortion is the fact that domestic rms can use local capital in case of disagreement: a
marginal increase in ki raises the commodity output that economy E would obtain from the
domestic technology in the event of bargaining breakdown, which translates into a maginal
increase in the State bargaining power measured by qx0h (k
?
i ). The increase in the State
bargaining power is an additional cost of investment for the foreign rm under Foreign Control
see (13) and is an additional benet for the State under Partnership see (14).
The last term appearing in (14) reects the fact that, under Partnership, the State already
holds the rights to use local capital and therefore savesthe cost of acquiring it if bargaining
breaks down. The foreign rm, instead, does not have residual rights over local capital under
Foreign Control since we are currently assuming conscation if bargaining breaks down. This
asymmetry in residual rights implies that the investment strategy under Partnership is closer
to the rst-best allocation relative to Foreign Control.11
11 In (13), the tendency of the foreign rm to under-invest is boosted by two self-reinforcing mechanisms.
In (14), instead, the residual-rights termsterilizes the double-interest termand the resulting condition (15)
implies that, under Partnership, the only deviation from the rst-best allocation consists of the bargaining-power
term.
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3.2 Income Levels and Prots
The general message of Proposition 1 is that, with respect to the rst-best allocation, Foreign
Control implies under-investment whereas Partnership yields over-investment in local capital.
We now discuss the consequences of these investment strategies for the equilibrium levels of
domestic income and foreign rms prots when the production technologies are given by (2) and
(4). In this case, the sign of income and prot gaps between alternative regimes is exclusively
determined by two parameters: the elasticity of commodity production to local capital,  2
(0; 1), and the index of productivity gap,
  '2='1 > 1;
which measures the extent to which the foreign technology is more productive than the domestic
technology. Setting sf = sp without loss of generality,12 we obtain the following
Proposition 2 Under the technologies (2) and (4), the investment rules (13)-(14) determine
a critical level of the productivity gap 0  e+2e 2  6:7 such that:
if  < 0 then Y
?
p > Y
?
f for any  2 (0; 1) ;
if  > 0 then there exists 0 () 2 (0; 1) such that

Y ?p > Y
?
f for any  > 0 () ;
Y ?p 6 Y ?f for any  6 0 () :
Concerning foreign rms prots, there exists a critical level of the productivity gap 1    (e) 
2:2 such that
if  < 1 then 
?
f > 
?
p for any  2 (0; 1) ;
if  > 1 then there exists 1 () 2 (0; 1) such that

?f > 
?
p for any  > 1 () ;
?f 6 ?p for any  6 1 () :
Both 0 () and 1 () are increasing in .
We stress that the threshold values 0  6:7 and 1  2:2 hold irrespective of the values
taken by all the parameters appearing in the model.13 Consequently, Proposition 2 is a valid
basis for assessing, in general, the probability of observing positive or negative gaps in income
and prot levels between Foreign Control and Partnership. In this respect, we obtain two main
results.
First, domestic income is higher under Partnership than under Foreign Control in the ma-
jority of parametrizations: Y ?p > Y
?
f holds in most cases, i.e., the portion of the parameter
12Recall that the start-up cost is paid by the foreign rm under both regimes i = (f; p). Setting sf = sp implies
that the foreign rm faces identical start-up costs independently of who is in charge of local capital investment.
This assumption is not restrictive because start-up costs are technology-specic: under Foreign Control and Part-
nership, commodity production is obtained using the same technology i.e., the foreign technology. Moreover,
the assumption sf = sp plays no role in the determination of the income gap Y ?p   Y ?f , which is una¤ected by
start-up costs (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix). Hence, letting sf 6= sp would only complicate the
comparison between rms prots under alternative regimes, ?f and 
?
p, without adding substantial insights to
our conclusions.
13The proof of Proposition 2 does not assume specic values for any of the parameters: the threshold levels
0  6:7 and 1  2:2 stem from the quasi-exponential forms that income gaps and prot gaps take under the
assumed production functions (2) and (4). See the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Regime rankings. Partnership yields higher income in the area lying above the 0
locus (Graph (a)) and higher prots in the area lying below the 1 locus (Graph (b)). The
joint rankings (Graph (c)) determine three parametrization spaces where set A is characterized
by Y ?p > Y
?
f and 
?
p > 
?
f .
space lying above the 0 () locus in Figure 1, graph (a). Foreign Control yields higher domes-
tic income only when the productivity gap is very high and the elasticity of capital is very low;
for example, if the foreign technology is ten times as productive as the domestic technology
( = 10), the capital elasticity must lie below the threshold level 0  0:19 in order to have
Y ?f > Y
?
p . The reason for this result is that Partnership implies two contrasting e¤ects on do-
mestic income: investment is higher than under Foreign Control (positive accumulation e¤ect)
but the rents paid to local capital employed in commodity production are entirely nanced by
taxes on domestic residents instead of being paid by the foreign rm (negative rent e¤ect).
The positive impact of the accumulation e¤ect typically dominates, but it is weaker the higher
is the productivity gap and the lower is the capital elasticity. Hence, for high  and low , the
negative rent e¤ect may dominate, in which case Partnership yields lower domestic income.14
The second implication of Proposition 2 is that the foreign rms prots are higher under
Partnership in many cases: as shown in Figure 1, graph (b), moderately high values of 
combined with moderately low values of  yield ?p > 
?
f . The intuition is twofold. On the one
hand, an increase in  increases the rental cost born by the foreign rm more than it increases
commodity production under Foreign Control relative to Partnership; this implies ?p > 
?
f
for high values of . On the other hand, an increase in the capital elasticity reduces the joint
surplus more under Partnership than under Foreign Control because the State (foreign rm)
overinvests (underinvest) in local capital, and this implies ?p > 
?
f for low values of .
14See the Appendix (below the proof of Proposition 2) for further details on this point.
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3.3 Initial Regime Choice and Joint Optimality
Proposition 2 bears important consequences for the initial regime choice at Stage 0. In this
section, we characterize the optimality properties of control regimes in two logical steps. First,
we restrict our attention to the choice between Foreign Control or Partnership by assuming that
each of these two regimes yields to each party higher returns than Home Control (subsection
3.3.1). Second, we study the conditions under which one or both parties disregard Foreign
Control and/or Partnership because Home Control yields higher payo¤s (subsection 3.3.2).
Importantly, we do not assume a specic type of game or bargaining procedure for determining
the initial choice at Stage 0. The analysis is more general in the sense that we study the
optimality properties and the characteristics of agreeability of the di¤erent control regimes.
On this basis, we can determine which regimes can arise as (optimal) outcomes of di¤erent
bargaining procedures at Stage 0. To this aim, we exploit the following denitions.
Considering Foreign Control and Partnership, regime i = (f; p) is agreeable for the State if
it implies Y ?i > Y
?
h , and is agreeable for the foreign rm if it implies 
?
i > 0. Accordingly,
regime i = (f; p) is jointly agreeable if it implies Y ?i > Y
?
h and 
?
i > 0. In other words,
(joint) agreeability signals whether one (every) party is willing to make an agreement on regime
i = (f; p) at Stage 0. Considering all the three regimes, we label regime i as jointly optimal if
it guarantees the highest payo¤ to each party that is, if it yields maximal income and prots
with respect to all alternative regimes. Accordingly, we will call spontaneous agreement an
agreement at Stage 0 that implements the jointly optimal regime.
3.3.1 Optimality: Foreign Control versus Partnership
Suppose that both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable: the foreign rm and
the State strictly prefer regimes f and p to Home Control. Combining the loci 0 () and 1 ()
dened in Proposition 2, we obtain the joint rankings of domestic income and foreign rms
prots. The remarkable result is that only Partnership can be jointly optimal. More precisely,
dening the four parametrization sets
A 
n
(; ) : Y ?p > Y
?
f and 
?
p > 
?
f
o
; B 
n
(; ) : Y ?p < Y
?
f and 
?
p > 
?
f
o
;
C 
n
(; ) : Y ?p > Y
?
f and 
?
p < 
?
f
o
; G 
n
(; ) : Y ?p < Y
?
f and 
?
p < 
?
f
o
;
we can prove that (A;B;C) are all non-empty whereas G is empty. In other words, Foreign
Control can never be jointly optimal because the inequalities Y ?p < Y
?
f and 
?
p < 
?
f cannot
hold simultaneously. This result is graphically shown in Figure 1, graph (c), and formally
established below.15
Proposition 3 Suppose that both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable under
technologies (2) and (4). Then, Foreign Control cannot be jointly optimal. Partnership, instead,
is jointly optimal provided that (; ) 2 A.
15The result G = ; is derived in the Appendix  see the proof of Proposition 3. In particular, it is shown
that lim!1 1 () = 1 whereas lim!1 0 () < 0:5, so that the 1 () locus always lies above the 0 () locus:
1 (
0) > 0 (
0) holds for any 0 as well as in the limit as 0 ! 1. Hence, in graphical terms, we can set 
arbitrarily large in Figure 1, graph (c), and stil obtain the three parametrization spaces A;B;C as well as G = ;.
See Figure 3 (f) in Appendix for an enlarged picture with  2 (1; 100).
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Proposition 3 establishes that only Partnership can be a spontaneous agreement at Stage
0. Under parametrization A, each party chooses Partnership and has no incentive to deviate
because this regime maximizes each partys payo¤. Foreign Control cannot be a spontaneous
equilibrium because all the parametrizations outside A entail conict between the parties. The
State (foreign rm) strictly prefers Partnership (Foreign Control) under parametrization C, and
viceversa under parametrization B. In these cases, which regime is going to be implemented
depends on the bargaining environment at Stage 0: di¤erent procedures may yield di¤erent
solutions to the inherent conict. To stress this point, we will henceforth call conditional
agreement any agreement reached at Stage 0 when no jointly optimal agreement exists.
Among the various conditional agreements that may arise under parametrizations C or B,
of particular interest are the outcomes in which the State fully exerts its initial bargaining
power to obtain the most favorable conditions for domestic residents. Being the de jure owner
of the resource endowment at Stage 0, the State may impose bargaining procedures that lead
to the income-maximizing outcome. An extreme but clear example is the case in which the
State makes a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er to the foreign rm at Stage 0: the State proposes only
Partnership (only Foreign Control) under parameterization C (parametrization B) and the for-
eign rm accepts because the proposed regime yields higher prots relative to the reservation
level, 0. Obviously, the take-it-or-leave-ito¤er is just an example, and alternative bargain-
ing procedures may yield di¤erent conditional agreements that favor the foreign rm instead.
Tackling this issue is not our main objective. In the remainder of the analysis, we keep the
bargaining procedure at Stage 0 unspecied, and focus on the more general question of which
regimes are agreeable, and which regime is jointly optimal, in a complete ranking that compares
Home Control, Foreign Control and Partnership.
3.3.2 Agreeability: Complete Characterization
The results discussed in the previous subsection characterize the initial regime choice when
both Foreign Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable. A complete characterization of the
outcomes, however, requires considering all the other cases in which Home Control yields higher
benets than one or both regimes to one or both parties. In this respect, a crucial role is played
by the value of the reservation prot for the foreign rm, 0. For each party, the agreeability
of each negotiated regime is determined by a specic inequality that restricts the value of the
reservation prot:
Y ?p > Y
?
h i¤ 0 < 
yp
0 ; 
?
p > 0 i¤ 0 < 
p
0 ;
Y ?f > Y
?
h i¤ 0 < 
yf
0 ; 
?
f > 0 i¤ 0 < 
f
0 :
(16)
The intuition behind the upper-bounds that determine agreeability for the State, yp0 and 
yf
0 ,
is that a high reservation prot implies high disagreement payo¤ for the foreign rm and thereby
a lower share of the prots from commodity production for domestic residents: the higher 0
the higher the probability that the State prefers Home Control to the alternative regimes. The
upper-bounds determining agreeability for the foreign rm, p0 and 
f
0 , signal that the rm
will prefer Partnership and/or Foreign Control only if the protability of operating abroad, 0,
is su¢ ciently low.
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Parametrizations and agreeable regimes
0 A B C1 C2
High Home (optimal) Home (optimal) Home (optimal) Home (optimal)
Intermediate Partnership Partnership Partnership Foreign
Low Partnership optimal Foreign/Partnership Foreign/Partnership Foreign/Partnership
Table 2: Agreeable and implemented regimes in relation to the foreign rms reservation prot.
Combining the restrictions imposed by Home Control in (16) with the parametrization
sets (A;B;C) previously dened, we can determine which regimes are agreeable, and possibly
optimal, as the reservation prot ranges from low to high values. Importantly, some of the
upper-bounds listed in (16) can be explicitly ranked: as shown in the Appendix, the inequalities
yp0 > 
p
0 and 
yp
0 > 
f
0 (17)
hold for any constellation of parameters. Result (17) restricts the sequence of regimes that are
jointly agreeable as the reservation prot varies. For example, suppose that (; ) belongs to
the parametrization set B. In this case, we necessarily16 have yf0 > 
yp
0 > 
p
0 > 
f
0 . This
implies that both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable for low levels of the
reservation prot; only Partnership is jointly agreeable for intermediate levels of the reservation
prot; only Home Control can arise for high levels of the reservation prot, and is possibly jointly
optimal.17 Repeating this exercise for all parametrizations, we obtain the results reported in
Table 2 where, under parametrization C, we have two subcases, respectively labelled as C1
and C2 (see the Appendix for detailed proofs).
The most general result delivered by Table 2 is that Home Control is always associated
to high levels of the reservation prot. When 0 > maxff0 ;p0 g, neither Partnership nor
Foreign Control are jointly agreeable because the foreign rm surely prefers operating outside
economy E. Moreover, Home Control becomes jointly optimal when 0 > maxfyf0 ;yp0 g.
In the last row of Table 2, the reservation prot is su¢ ciently low to imply that both Foreign
Control and Partnership are jointly agreeable that is, we have 0 < minff0 ;yf0 ;p0 ;yp0 g.
In this case, the outcomes are those already emphasized in section 3.3.1: under parametrization
A, Partnership is jointly optimal; outside A, either regime may arise as a conditional agreement.
Concerning intermediate levels of the reservation prot, we obtain that Partnership is the
only agreeable regime in most albeit not all parametrizations. The reason is that, as 0 in-
creases, the rst restriction that is violated is, typically, either 0 < 
f
0 or 0 < 
yf
0 . In
other words, when the reservation prot increases from low to intermediate levels, the regime
of Foreign Control ceases to be agreeable for either the foreign rm or the State.
16By denition, parametrization B implies Y ?f > Y
?
p and 
?
p > 
?
f , which implies 
yf
0 > 
yp
0 and 
p
0 > 
f
0 .
Combining these inequalities with result (17) we obtain yf0 > 
yp
0 > 
p
0 > 
f
0 . Further details are reported
in the Appendix (see the complete proof of the results reported in Table 2).
17Specically, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable if 0 < 
f
0 ; only Partnership is
jointly agreeable if f0 < 0 < 
p
0 ; only Home Control can arise if 0 > 
p
0 ; moreover, Home Control is
jointly optimal if 0 > 
yf
0 .
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3.4 Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Testing
The results so far obtained shed light on two fundamental questions that deserve empirical
scrutiny. The rst concerns the relationship between control regimes and economic performance:
do Partnership-like regimes imply higher or lower aggregate income than Foreign Control?
Answering this question empirically is furthermore interesting in view of the fact that the
existing literature on ownership and resource extraction (e.g., Megginson, 2005; Wolf, 2009)
concentrates on the protability, or e¢ ciency, of the primary sectors without assessing the
impact on aggregate income. In this respect, our theoretical results strongly favor the hypothesis
that Partnerships are associated to higher income: Foreign Control cannot be a jointly optimal
outcome (cf. Proposition 3) and yields lower aggregate income under most parametrizations (cf.
Figure 1, graph (a)). In section 5, we tackle this issue at the empirical level in the context of oil-
producing economies, checking whether the dominance of Partnership-like (Foreign Control-like)
regimes in the oil-extracting sector is actually associated to higher (lower) levels of aggregate
domestic income.
A second empirical question is suggested by Table 2, which associates the rise of specic
control regimes to the level of the reservation prot. Since 0 measures how convenient is to
operate outside E for the foreign rm, the reservation prot in our model can be interpreted as
an inverse index of the protability of the economys resource base relative to the protability
of the resource stocks existing in the rest of the world.18 In this respect, Table 2 suggests an
interesting hypothesis: high relative protability of resource extraction in E (that is, low 0)
is associated with either Partnership or Foreign Control; intermediate relative protability in
E (that is, intermediate 0) is mostly associated with Partnership; low relative protability
in E (that is, high 0) is associated with Home Control. In section 5, we test this prediction
empirically by checking which regimes are associated to di¤erent degrees of relative protability
in resource extraction.
Before turning to the empirics, some remarks on the robustness of our theoretical results
are in order. In the next section, we show that our main conclusions do not change if the State
assigns to the foreign rm the correct amountof residual rights of control over local capital.
4 Residual Rights and Credible Repurchase
So far, we have assumed that the foreign rm expects the conscation of local capital if negoti-
ations break down at the prot-sharing stage. This expectation has an impact on both income
and prots under Foreign Control because the lack of residual rights on capital further reduces
the foreign rms incentive to invest. We now extend the model to include (partial) residual
rights for the foreign rm. Suppose that, in the event of bargaining breakdown under Foreign
Control, the State is willing to compensate (a fraction of) the investment cost initially born by
the foreign rm before transferring kf to domestic rms. We denote by  2 (0; 1) the fraction
18 This interpretation can be easily formalized in our model. In expression (4), we have dened the scale
parameter  > 0 as a country-specic characteristic e.g., the size of the domestic resource endowment. This
implies that, if the foreign rm operates in economy E, the residual prots are an increasing function of  .
Similarly, the reservation prot will be an increasing function 0 ( 0), where  0 denotes the resource endowment
that the foreign rm might exploit outside economy E. The level of the reservation prot is therefore an inverse
index of the international relative protability of the domestic resource endowment in economy E.
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of the investment cost rfkf repaid by the State. Letting  ! 0, we are back to the case of
conscation. Letting ! 1, the State buys residual rights at full price (complete repurchase).
The issue of residual rights is empirically relevant: partial or complete State repurchase, or
the granting of preferential access to expropriatedrms, is often observed in reality (Philip,
1994). Resource-rich States compensate the foreign rms investment for a variety of reasons
that typically include political opportunity. In our model, there is a clear incentive for the State
to compensate the foreign rm: the concession of residual rights over kf increases the foreign
rms willingness to invest, which creates potential gains in domestic income under Foreign
Control.
Formally, we assume that the initial contract signed at Stage 0 contains a declaration stat-
ing which degree of repurchase  will be applied in case of breakdown under Foreign Control.
Clearly, the declaration is e¤ective only under credible commitment: in the absence of commit-
ment devices, the State is tempted to conscate the foreign rms local capital. We thus have
two polar cases. If the Statedeclaration concerning repurchase is not credible, the foreign rm
rationally expects conscation and therefore operates under the hypothesis that the true  is
zero; in this scenario, all our previous analysis remains valid and the results of section 3 con-
tinue to hold. If, instead, the commitment is fully credible e.g., because the initial contract is
subject to international laws that are binding for the State19 the foreign rm expects the true
 to coincide with the initially declared value; in this case, we obtain the results summarized
below.
4.1 Prot Sharing and Investment with Credible Repurchase
The introduction of credible repurchase only a¤ects the regime of Foreign Control. The bar-
gaining payo¤s in (5) are unchanged whereas the no-trade payo¤s of both parties under Foreign
Control, Df and f , are replaced by
Df  qxh (kf)  sh   rfkf and f  0   sf   (1  ) rfkf; (18)
where the subscript fdenotes the regime of Foreign Control under credible repurchase. At
Stage 2, the Nash bargaining solution yields the ex-post levels of domestic income and foreign
rms prots
Y Nf = qzzf + rfkf +
1
2
 qxh (kf)  2rfkf + qxf (kf)  sh  0 ; (19)
Nf =
1
2
 qxf (kf)  2 (1  ) rfkf   qxh (kf) + 0 + sh   2sf  : (20)
At Stage 1, the foreign rm chooses k?f in order to maximize (20). In an interior solution, the
investment strategy is characterized by
qx
0
f
 
k?f

= 2r?f|{z}
Double interest
+ qx
0
h(k
?
f)| {z }
Bargaining power
  2r?f| {z }
Residual rights
for 0 < k?f < kmax: (21)
Condition (21) replaces and generalizes our previous result (13). The introduction of credible
repurchase creates residual control rights for the foreign rm and therefore boosts investment:
19For example, modern petroleum contracts typically include explicit provisions for arbitration in case of
disputes (Taverne 1994; Onorato 1995).
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k?f increases with . However, granting complete residual rights to the foreign rm,  = 1,
is not desirable from an e¢ ciency viewpoint: albeit a moderate degree of repurchase contrasts
the foreign rms tendency to under-invest, an excessive degree of repurchase would induce
over-investment in commodity production. The following results clarify this point.
Assume that the production technologies are given by (2) and (4). Then, there exists an
upper bound for the degree of repurchase, max, above which the investment problem has a
corner solution where the foreign rm reaps all the available capital and the traditional sector
disappears (see Appendix):
9 max < 1 such that  > max implies k?f = kmax and zf = 0: (22)
Hence, an interior solution to the investment problem requires 0 <  < max. The intuition is
that excessive residual rights drive the overall marginal investment cost for the rm to zero and
thus push investment toward the maximum feasible level. More generally, increasing the degree
of repurchase generates a tradeo¤ in aggregate income levels. As  ranges from zero to max,
commodity production xf increases due to higher investment but traditional production zf
shrinks due to the crowding-out of local capital. In particular, there exists a critical threshold
level of the degree of repurchase, ~, above (below) which the positive income e¤ect of higher
commodity production dominates (is dominated by) the negative income e¤ect of crowding-out
in the traditional sector:
Proposition 4 Under technologies (2) and (4), the equilibrium domestic income under Foreign
Control with credible repurchase, Y ?f, is a hump-shaped function of  within the relevant range
0 < ~ < max; the maximum, characterized by @Y ?f () =@ = 0, is associated to the threshold
level
 = ~  2 +  (   1)
 + 1 +  (   1) < 1; (23)
which lies within the relevant range 0 < ~ < max provided that kmax is su¢ ciently large.
Instead, the equilibrium prot of the foreign rm, ?f, is an increasing convex function of .
Proposition 4 delivers two important results. First, the income-maximizing degree of resid-
ual rights always lies between the polar cases of conscationand complete repurchase; the
corollary is that the State should not grant complete residual rights over local capital to the
foreign rm because a high value of  generates negative e¤ects on total domestic income.
Second, residual rights over local capital have opposite consequences under di¤erent regimes.
Under Partnership, the State has complete residual rights over k?p and this pushes investment
close to the e¢ cient level (see Proposition 1). Under Foreign Control, instead, assigning com-
plete residual rights to the rm,  = 1, implies massive over-investment in the commodity
sector because the foreign rm does not care about the crowding-out e¤ects that this strategy
induces in the traditional sector.
Both these results stem from our main behavioral assumption: the State aims at maximizing
domestic income whereas the foreign rm only pursues prot maximization at the sectoral level.
We also stress that, if we interpret the scenario of massive crowding-out as a Resource-Curse
phenomenonthat is, a reduction in aggregate productivity induced by the creation of the
resource-based sector our results unveil a new potential explanation for the low income levels
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that characterize many resource-rich countries: the concession of excessive residual control
rights to foreign rms that exploit domestic critical resources.20
4.2 Income, Prots and Regime Choice with Credible Repurchase
In the analysis of section 3.2, we characterized the income and prot gaps arising between For-
eign Control and Partnership in terms of two parameters,  and . Under credible repurchase,
relative incomes and prots also depend on . In the limiting case  = 0, we re-obtain the pre-
vious results. In this subsection, we concentrate on the case  = ~, that is, we assume that the
State declares the degree of repurchase that maximizes domestic income under Foreign Control.
This hypothesis is furthermore reasonable if we interpret  as a potential control variable for
the State at Stage 0.21
The analysis of the case  = ~ essentially conrms our previous results, the only di¤erence
being that credible repurchase restricts the parametrization space in which Partnership is jointly
optimal. Still, there is no possibility that Foreign Control is jointly optimal. The analogy with
Propositions 2 and 3 is formally established below.
Proposition 5 Under the investment rules (14) and (21) with  = ~, the technologies (2) and
(4) determine a critical level of the productivity gap 2  1+ln 21 ln 2  5:5 such that:
if  < 2 then Y
?
p > Y
?
f for any  2 (0; 1) ;
if  > 2 then there exists 2 () 2 (0; 1) such that

Y ?p > Y
?
f for any  > 2 () ;
Y ?p 6 Y ?f for any  6 2 () :
For foreign rms prots, there exists a critical level of the productivity gap 3  1+ 2ln(2)  3:9
such that
if  < 3 then 
?
f > 
?
p for any  2 (0; 1) ;
if  > 3 then there exists 3 () 2 (0; 1) such that

?f > 
?
p for any  > 3 () ;
?f 6 ?p for any  6 3 () :
The combined thresholds 2 () and 3 () imply that, when both regimes are jointly agreeable,
Partnership can be jointly optimal whereas Foreign Control cannot be jointly optimal.
Figure 2 graphically represents the critical thresholds dened in Proposition 5 and compares
them to the thresholds previously obtained in the basic model with  = 0. The bold-style
curves are the new loci 2 () and 3 (), the dotted-style curves are the old loci 0 ()
and 1 (). The three diagrams show that credible repurchase restricts the portions of the
20The theoretical explanations for the rise of Resource-Curse phenomena are numerous and diverse  see
van der Ploeg (2011) but mostly fall in three categories: (i) Dutch-Disease mechanisms, (ii) bad institutions
and/or rent-seeking behavior, (iii) crowding-out of inputs from strategic non-resource sectors. To our knowledge,
the literature on this topic has so far neglected the possibility that the crowding-out mechanism stems from
incomplete contracts and the granting of excessive residual rights to foreign rms.
21The exogenous or endogenous nature of  is not relevant for our analysis as long as we do not specify the
bargaining procedure determining the initial regime choice at Stage 0. When solving the model backwards, the
value of  is taken as a given parameter in Stages 1,2,3 because it is xed at Stage 0. Nonetheless, studying
the strategic interactions between the initial regime choice and the choice of the degree of repurchase  is an
interesting extension of the model which may deserve further analysis.
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Figure 2: Regime rankings under credible repurchase with  = ~. Partnership yields higher
income in the area lying above the 2 locus (Graph (a)) and higher prots in the area lying
below the 3 locus (Graph (b)). The joint rankings (Graph (c)) determine three parametrization
spaces where set ~A is characterized by Y ?p > Y
?
f and 
?
p > 
?
f.
parameter space in which Partnership yields higher income and higher prots. This means that
credible repurchase enhances the returns from enacting Foreign Control for both the State and
the foreign rm.
However, like in the basic model with  = 0, the regime of Foreign Control cannot be
jointly optimal: we cannot have Y ?f > Y
?
p and 
?
f > 
?
p simultaneously. This is shown in
Figure 2, graph (c), where the three parametrization sets ( ~A; ~B; ~C) are dened analogously to
(A;B;C). When both regimes are jointly agreeable, the only regime that can be jointly optimal
is Partnership: credible repurchase restricts but does not eliminate this possibility.
Another remark concerns the superiority of Partnership in generating domestic income:
despite the introduction of credible repurchase, the area in which Y ?f > Y
?
p holds is limited.
Moreover, if we consider alternative scenarios in which  6= ~, the space in which Y ?f > Y ?p
holds becomes even smaller (total income under Foreign Control is maximized when  = ~).
Hence, the previous conclusion that Partnership induces higher domestic income in the majority
of parametrizations is indeed robust to the introduction of residual rights for the foreign rm.
Also our previous results concerning the role of the reservation prot (section 3.3.2) are
fully conrmed in the current setting. Under credible repurchase with  = ~, the conditions
determining the agreeability of Foreign Control in (16) are replaced by
Y ?f > Y
?
h i¤ 0 < ~
yf
0 ; 
?
f > 0 i¤ 0 < ~
f
0 ; (24)
where the upper-bounds ~yf0 and ~
f
0 can be explicitly derived under technologies (4). In line
with the basic model with conscation, we can prove that
yp0 >
~f0 and 
yp
0 > 
p
0 (25)
hold for any constellation of parameters. Result (25) is analogous to (17), and implies the
same scenarios described in Table 2, with reference to the new parametrization sets ( ~A; ~B; ~C).
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The bottom-line is that the main predictions of the basic model with conscation ( = 0)
hold even under credible repurchase at the income-maximizing rate ( = ~). This reinforces
our previous remarks on the testable predictions of the model (subsection 3.4), and provides
further legitimation to the empirical analysis presented below.
5 Empirical Evidence
Our objective is to test the two main theoretical predictions described in section 3.4. First, we
explore the relationship between the control rights regime governing the petroleum sector and
national income, and test whether Partnership does indeed lead to higher domestic income than
Foreign Control (Prediction 1). Second, we look at the link between relative protability in the
petroleum sector and control rights regimes, testing whether Foreign Control and Partnership
are always linked to higher relative protability than Home Control (Prediction 2). We
start out by describing the data and empirical methodology, and then present and discuss the
estimation results.
5.1 Data Description
Our dataset includes information on 68 oil-producing countries from all regions of the world
(see the Appendix for a detailed list). The main criteria for inclusion in the dataset were that
the country had a minimum of 0.2 billion barrels in (proved) oil reserves between 1980-2008,
and that it produced an average of at least 20000 barrels of crude oil per day during one year
or more over the same period. The principal source for this information was the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), though we cross-checked the entries with the BP Statistical
Review of World Energy (2010), which covers fewer countries in detail, but over a longer time
period. Our criteria thus enable us to include many countries that are not usually considered
oil-rich, as well as oil producers from both the developed and the developing world. Our sample
includes 96.6 percent of known proved crude oil reserves in 1980, while in 2008 the share goes
up to 99.9 percent.
Our main variable of interest is the control rights structure of the petroleum industry.
Following the theoretical model, we distinguish between Domestic or Home, Foreign, and mixed
domestic-foreign (i.e. Partnership) control rights regimes, and focus on oil exploration and
extraction/ production.22 Our classication methodology is inspired by the one developed by
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010), but di¤ers from it in that we distinguish between
domestic, foreign, and mixed domestic-foreign control of the petroleum sector.23 Moreover, our
sample includes a wider range of countries from both the developed and the developing world,
while Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) concentrate mainly on transition economies. We
code each country according to the following criteria:
22The oil renery and petroleum-derived products industries are not considered, as these do not presume the
presence of an actual oil production sector in a country and are therefore more similar to other manufacturing
sectors.
23Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001, 2010) draw up four categories of resource ownership: state ownership
with control, state ownership without control, private domestic ownership, and private foreign ownership. They
propose a (qualitative) theory of how petroleum ownership structures inuence scal policy outcomes.
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Domestic control : The state or private domestic rm(s) holds the rights to develop the majority
of petroleum deposits and owns the majority of shares (over 50%) in the oil sector. The
managerial power lies mainly in domestic hands, with foreign involvement being limited
to roles with little or no operational and managerial control (e.g., service contracts).
Partnership: The rights to develop the majority of petroleum deposits and the majority
of shares (over 50%) in the oil sector lie in domestic hands, but there is substantial
involvement by foreign rms. Both domestic and foreign oil rms (private or public) have
operational and managerial competencies, e.g., through Production Sharing Agreements
(PSAs).
Foreign control : Foreign (private or state-owned) rms hold the rights to develop the majority
of petroleum deposits and own the majority of shares (over 50%) in the domestic oil
sector. The managerial power lies mainly in foreign hands, e.g., via concessions.
As these criteria imply, control right structures are seldom absolute in the sense that either
domestic or foreign rms hold the exclusive rights to all exploration and extraction of petro-
leum. For practical purposes, the essential point is who holds the majority rights to develop
petroleum deposits according to domestic legislation. For the coding, we rely on the countries
constitutions, o¢ cial laws and regulations governing the petroleum sector, sample petroleum
contracts (where available), and secondary sources. The initial (post-independence) year of
inclusion of each country is based on the date of the rst national law, rule or regulation per-
taining explicitly to the petroleum sector, as opposed to general mining sector regulation.24
Note that for the case of former colonies, the simple act of maintaining colonial-era contracts
upon independence until their expiry does not constitute a national law in the sense of it being
passed deliberately by a sovereign government. The year of inclusion of a country in our dataset
does therefore not necessarily coincide with its year of gaining independence. We have been
able to gather information on control right structures for 68 countries starting as early as 1867
up until 2008, with the average time period of a countrys inclusion being around 53 years.
We are aware that there is often a time lag between the introduction of a new piece of
legislation and its full implementation throughout the petroleum industry. For example, the
decision to switch from a domestic control structure to partnership may involve delineating the
geographical sectors to be o¤ered for tender to foreign companies, organizing the bidding rounds,
and drawing up the nal contracts, a process which can take several months or even years.
However, a legislative change in control rights structures is usually eventually transformed into
a real change, which is why we concentrate on the date of the passing of the legislation rather
than on the less precisely denable date of its full implementation.25
24The only exception is Canada, where petroleum-specic legislation is passed by the provincial governments,
while the national government sets out the laws for the mining sector in general. The rst mining sector law
was passed in 1867, the year of Canadas independence from Great Britain. Given that oil rening (for kerosene
production) was originally invented in Canada in the 1840s, and that the Canadian petroleum industry developed
in parallel with that of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, we argue that the 1867
law fully applies to the petroleum sector. Canada therefore enters our dataset in 1867.
25A borderline case is presented by Argentina between 1910-1963. The original executive decree of December
1907 excluded private concessions for the newly-discovered petroleum reserves, and therefore set up a majority
domestic control structure. However, after Law 7059 of 1910, the deposits were little by little opened to exploita-
tion by private (mostly foreign) investors, with the new national oil company being limited to the deposits on
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We condense the dataset into ve-year periods to avoid capturing short-term uctuations,
starting with the period 1870-1874, 1875-1879, ..., until 2005-2008, for a total of potentially 28
periods and 762 observations. Since not all countries enter the dataset at the same time, we have
an unbalanced panel. 206 country-periods had domestic control; 316 had foreign control; and
240 had partnership. 36 countries from all parts of the world changed their regimes at least once
during the period of observation, for a total of nearly 60 switches. Many changed regimes twice
or even more, with Bolivia showing a record ve changes since 1920. Several of these regime
changes, especially in the pre-1970 period, came in the wake of general national upheavals such
as revolutions or other profound changes in the political regime. In more recent times, changes
have usually come about more smoothly during the course of adapting the control regimes to
new developments and learning processes.
5.2 Methodology
We use two di¤erent approaches to test the two predictions. Prediction 1 is tested with
the following panel xed-e¤ects estimation (note that the Hausman test rejects random-e¤ects
estimation in favor of xed e¤ects):
Yit = 1 + 2regimedummyit + 3Xit + !it; (26)
where i is the country index and t is the period index. The dependent variable Yit is (the
natural logarithm of) real income per capita at the start of period t, taken from the historical
dataset of Maddison (2006) and measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP-adjusted USD. Xit is a
vector of control variables, and !it is the composite error term. Our main variable of interest
is regimedummyit and its coe¢ cient 2.
We have three 0-1 regime dummies for Domestic Control, Foreign Control and Partnership,
constructed according to the classication described above. A dummy takes on value one if a
country had the respective control regime for at least three of the ve years in a given period.
To test Prediction 1, we exclude all country-periods with Domestic Control and take Foreign
Control as our base regime to see whether Partnership leads to signicantly higher income than
Foreign. We term this the simple testof Prediction 1. In a second step, we also consider an
interesting extended testof Prediction 1, which includes all control rights regimes and thus
delivers a complete ranking of control regimes in terms of aggregate income. In the extended
test, we take Domestic control as our base outcome, testing whether Partnership and Foreign
Control (in that order) lead to higher incomes than Domestic Control with a given technology
level. The challenge lies in nding a good proxy for technology level: we will consider two
variables, average labor productivity per worker in a period, measured in thousands of 1990
USD (The Conference Board Total Economy Database, 2011), and average years of schooling
(Barro and Lee, 2010).26
the shrinking Public Lands. We thus classify the control regime as mixed domestic-foreign from 1910-1963, even
though several decrees passed between 1910-1955 tried to limit the activities of (foreign) private oil companies,
with very little e¤ect on the ourishing industry. There was therefore a certain discrepancy between formal
regulation and practice on the ground, which persisted for several decades. It wasnt until nationalization in
1963 that all private oil companiescontracts were truly and nally declared null and void a situation which
however lasted only until 1966, when mixed domestic-foreign control was fully mandated by law (Solberg, 1979).
26The correlation coe¢ cient between labor productivity and schooling years is 0.51.
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In addition to the proxies for technology levels described above, we include the following
control variables. First, a dummy variable for OPEC countries to take into consideration the
possible e¤ects of the wave of privatizations that swept through the major oil producers in
the late 1950s and 1960s and led to the Organizations creation. This provides an exogenous,
historical reason for the adoption of a particular control rights structure (see also the discussion
below). We also include two political variables taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et
al., 2010) to control for the e¤ects of institutional quality on the choice of petroleum sector
contracts a country o¤ers. Foreign or Partnership regimes would be less likely in countries with
poor institutional quality and unstable or unpredictable political systems, as this increases the
uncertainty for foreign rms evaluating an investment in the oil sector.27 The rst political
measure is the composite variable polity (i.e. the polity2 variable from the original Polity IV
dataset), which takes on values within a range from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong
democracy). The second is one of the component variables of the total polity score, namely
executive constraints: this measures the decision rules, or the extent to which chief executives
face institutionalized constraints on their decision-making. It arguably also proxies for the
strength of the legal system and particularly property rights (see also Acemoglu and Johnson,
2005). Values range between 1 (unlimited authority) and 7 (executive parity or subordination).
We expect both political measures to enter with a positive sign. In further robustness tests, we
also include period dummies.
All independent variables except for the OPEC and time dummies are lagged by one period.
Similar results were obtained for up to seven lags (i.e. 35 years) in the simple test of Prediction
1, and up to ve lags (i.e. 25 years) in the extended test. We believe that this robustness to
using various time lags is particularly relevant when it comes to the question of reverse causality:
although not considered by the theoretical model, it can be argued that the development level
(i.e. the income) of a country inuences its choice of control regime. However, income levels
are surely less persistent than the 25-35 year period for which our results hold, making the
hypothesized direction of inuence from control regime towards income instead of vice versa
more probable.28
The composite error term consists of the country-specic error component i and the com-
bined cross-section and time series error component uit, according to !it = i + uit. The
assumption of the classical error component model is that any temporal persistence is due to
the presence of the same country i across the panel, and that this e¤ect can be captured by
the xed country term i. However, this is likely to be too restrictive here, where a shock -
e.g., a control regime change - in one period is likely to a¤ect the behavioral relationship for
several periods (see e.g., Baltagi, 2008, ch. 5.2). The error component uit would then be serially
correlated across periods: tests following Wooldridge (2002) conrm this suspicion. Failing to
correct standard errors for serial correlation leads to biased statistical inference and less e¢ cient
estimates. We tackle this problem by reporting two di¤erent estimates of the standard errors.
The rst uses robust clustered errors at the panel (i.e. country) level. This approach of one-
level-up clustering - in this case, at the country instead of the country-period level - allows for
27For example, Jodice (1980) argues that the propensity to expropriate foreign rms is a¤ected by political
factors such as state capacity and the stability of the political system.
28We are not interested in dynamic e¤ects and the partial adjustment of income to ownership structures over
time, so we do not add a lagged dependent variable. Note however that the main results of the extended test of
Prediction 1 are robust to the addition of lagged income.
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unrestricted correlation of the residuals within clusters (see e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009, ch.
8). The second approach uses adjusted standard errors according to the nonparametric covari-
ance matrix estimator suggested by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and adapted by Hoechle (2007)
to unbalanced panels. This approach has the added advantage of producing heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors that are robust to very general types of both temporal and spatial
dependence. The latter point may be important when we consider the possible di¤usion and
contagion e¤ects of events across oil producers, for example the signalling e¤ect of the unsuc-
cessful nationalization of the petroleum sector in Iran in 1951 or the formation of OPEC in
1960.29
Prediction 2 is tested with a pooled multinomial logit estimation:
controlregimeit = 1 + 2relprofitit + 3Xit +  (27)
where  is the error term. The dependent variable controlregime is derived from a recoding
of the previous control regime dummies to take on values 1 (Domestic Control), 2 (Foreign
Control), or 3 (Partnership). 1 = Domestic is our base outcome.
Our main variable of interest here is relprot, which measures the relative protability of the
domestic oil sector vis-à-vis other countries. According to the theory, the higher the relative
protability, the higher the likelihood of adopting either a mixed domestic-foreign (Partnership)
or Foreign control regime; for intermediate levels of relative protability, Partnership should
be the most likely outcome; Home Control should always be linked to the lowest protability.
In line with our interpretation of international relative protability (see footnote 18), we
identify relprot with the countrys share (in percent) of total proved crude oil reserves in a
period, where the total oil reserves is the sum of all known and proved oil reserves in our sample
of 68 oil producers. The main sources for the reserves data were the EIA (2010), BP (2010),
Jenkins (1989), the UK Institute of Geological Sciences (IGS, various years), and the German
Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohsto¤e (various years). The earliest available data
is from 1935: at that time, the United States had around 63 percent of proved crude oil reserves.
The U.S. oil reserves share drops to 21.8 percent in 1960, when data on Saudi Arabia becomes
available, and to 8.6 percent in 1970, when oil reserves for most major current oil producers are
known; in 2005, U.S. oil reserves made up for barely 2.5 percent of proved oil reserves, while
Saudi Arabia alone had over 21 percent.
The basic additional variables included in Xit are dummies for the top 20 oil countries,
dened as the twenty countries with the highest relative oil shares in 1995 (and later), plus
the USSR (and without the former Soviet republics) for the pre-1995 period.30 Further control
variables include the OPEC dummy and the political measures described above; labor produc-
tivity and years of schooling as proxies for the level of technology; and the average oil price
over the previous ve years (in constant 2009 USD, from BP, 2010). The latter captures the
29For example, Myers Ja¤e (2007) argues that the events in Iran between 1951-54 - the failed oil sector
nationalization - a¤ected policy in Iraq, since the Iraqi government was considering similar measures to increase
its share in foreign companiesoil prots, but then opted for a less aggressive ownership strategy. On di¤usion
as a possible exogenous explanation for nationalization (or lack thereof), see also Kobrin (1985).
30 In addition to the USSR, the following country dummies are included: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, United States, Libya, Nigeria, China, Kazakhstan, Norway,
Canada, Algeria, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Oman. Results remain robust when adding dummies for the top 30 oil
countries. Adding the full range of country dummies - down to the countries with less than 0.5 percent of total
oil reserves shares - proved fruitless, since most coe¢ cients were completely insignicant.
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Table 3: Prediction 1: Partnership vs Foreign control and income levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Partnership 0.300*** 0.283*** 0.203** 0.282** 0.198*
(2.699) (3.171) (2.219) (2.638) (1.750)
[4.44] [3.80] [2.80] [4.22] [2.85]
Polity 0.0367*** 0.0345***
(4.011) (4.190)
[4.38] [4.17]
Executive constraints 0.00279*** 0.00226**
(3.603) (2.514)
[4.12] [2.71]
OPEC 0.639*** 0.689***
(6.316) (3.796)
[4.18] [4.18]
Constant 8.242*** 8.198*** 8.146*** 8.247*** 8.187***
(170.7) (208.8) (224.0) (177.6) (178.1)
[75.49] [88.45] [91.13] [76.72] [78.46]
Observations 465 465 465 465 465
Number of countries 60 60 60 60 60
Ave obs per country 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
R2within 0.035 0.126 0.174 0.044 0.099
Notes : Countries with Domestic Control are excluded, so Foreign Control is base outcome. The dependent
variable is (log) income per capita at start of ve-year period. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are
lagged by one period. Estimations are xed e¤ects (within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-
clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. , , 
statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to country-clustered standard errors).
incentives for regime change (particularly nationalization) that governments may have as a re-
sult of rising oil prices (see e.g., Guriev et al., 2011). Finally, we include the lagged dependent
variable (controlregimeit 1) in some specications to account for time dependence in control
regimes: this should allow us to separate the transition to a certain regime from the persistence
of a regime once adopted (note that the theoretical model, being static, does not distinguish
between the two). Details for all variables are provided in the Appendix.
5.3 Estimation results
Prediction 1. Table 3 shows the results for the simple testof Prediction 1 without consid-
ering the countries with Domestic Control throughout the period examined, which eliminates
three out of the potential 63 countries for which we have all data available. The rst and most
important nding is that all specications show that Partnership leads to signicantly higher
income than Foreign Control, as predicted by the theory. The total income e¤ect for choosing a
mixed domestic-foreign control regime over mainly foreign control is estimated at 20-30 percent,
keeping all else equal. Moreover, the e¤ect remains signicant even when we successively add
measures of political institutions and the OPEC membership dummy.
Both measures of political institutions are positive and highly signicant, which well ac-
cords with other studies demonstrating the importance of institutions for economic develop-
ment. OPEC countries also seem to have had signicantly higher income levels than non-OPEC
members; this is probably due to the income e¤ect of oil production and export among these
large oil-exporting economies. The estimation t, as captured by the within R2, is also quite
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Table 4: Extended Prediction 1: control regimes and income levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Partnership 0.169 0.257*** 0.241*** 0.247*** 0.254*** 0.260***
(1.251) (4.788) (4.527) (4.911) (4.744) (5.045)
[1.64] [5.07] [5.92] [6.59] [5.13] [5.55]
Foreign -0.290** 0.110** 0.099* 0.117** 0.113** 0.131***
(-2.283) (2.075) (1.843) (2.518) (2.111) (2.807)
[-1.76] [2.04] [2.70] [3.49] [2.06] [2.49]
Polity 0.01*** 0.01***
(2.786) (2.713)
[1.57] [1.55]
Executive constraints 0.001 0.001
(1.108) (1.152)
[1.55] [1.61]
OPEC 0.152 0.156
(1.212) (1.308)
[2.08] [2.31]
Labor productivity 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(4.967) (5.474) (5.436) (4.964) (4.928)
[6.19] [6.81] [6.76] [6.23] [6.20]
Constant 8.330*** 7.904*** 7.900*** 7.866*** 7.904*** 7.870***
(103.8) (80.42) (88.19) (88.59) (79.94) (79.36)
[78.97] [65.31] [66.13] [72.53] [65.49] [70.80]
Observations 648 455 453 453 455 455
Number of countries 63 57 57 57 57 57
Ave obs per country 10.3 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.0
R2 within 0.059 0.424 0.446 0.448 0.425 0.427
Notes : All countries in sample are included. Domestic Control is base outcome. The dependent variable is (log)
income per capita at start of ve-year period. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are lagged by one period.
Estimations are xed e¤ects (within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors
are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. , ,  statistically signicant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to country-clustered standard errors).
good considering the heterogeneous sample of countries, particularly when we look at the spec-
ications with the polity variable (columns (2)-(3)).
Table 4 shows the results for the estimations of our extended testof Prediction 1, including
our full sample of countries and periods. The relevant base outcome is now Domestic Control,
and we are testing whether Partnership and Foreign Control (in that order) lead to higher
income levels. This extended version of Prediction 1 presupposes that we e¤ectively account for
technology levels.We concentrate on the results with labor productivity, which proved highly
signicant; the results with years of schooling are shown in the Appendix.
Column (1) of Table 4 gives a parsimonious specication for comparison without controlling
for the technology level (i.e. labor productivity). We see that, ceteris paribus, Foreign Control
leads to lower per-capita income levels, while partnership has a positive, albeit insignicant
coe¢ cient. More important are the results in columns (2)-(6), obtained when controlling for
labor productivity. They show that both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher income
levels than Domestic Control regimes, holding all other factors xed, and that the di¤erence
is statistically signicant. More remarkably still, the coe¢ cients indicate that the ranking of
control regime corresponds to the one expected from the theory: Partnership has the highest
positive impact on income levels (between 24-26 percent higher than Domestic Control), followed
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Table 5: Prediction 1: robustness analysis with time e¤ects
simple test simple test extended test extended test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partnership 0.022 0.022 0.145** 0.156**
(0.331) (0.333) (2.162) (2.398)
[0.71] [0.71] [3.15] [3.36]
Foreign 0.099 0.121*
(1.374) (1.717)
[1.92] [2.20]
Polity 0.001 -0.005
(0.13) (1.182)
[0.10] [-2.96]
Labor productivity 0.017*** 0.018***
(7.14) (7.538)
[16.27] [17.79]
Constant 6.802*** 6.804*** 7.698*** 7.673***
(33.24) (33.77) (152.8) (171.0)
[39.99] [40.11] [213.42] [171.44]
Observations 465 465 455 453
Countries 60 60 57 57
Ave obs per country 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.9
R2 within 0.71 0.71 0.64 0.65
Notes : In columns (1)-(2) countries with Domestic Control are excluded, while in columns (3)-(4) all countries
in the sample are included. The dependent variable is (log) income per capita at start of ve-year period. Period
dummies are included in all specications. All covariates are lagged by one period. Estimations are xed e¤ects
(within) panel estimations. T-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses, and for
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively (refers to robust country-clustered standard errors).
by Foreign Control (between 10-13 percent higher than Domestic). A simple Wald test conrms
that this di¤erence in the coe¢ cients for Partnership and Foreign Control is indeed signicant
and systematic. Of the three ownership structures that we consider, Domestic Control invariably
leads to the lowest income levels. The additional variables have the expected signs, and the
estimation ts are remarkably good when we account for labor productivity.
In robustness tests, we consider several alternative specications. First, we add period
dummies to control for possible aggregate e¤ects such as time-specic oil demand or supply
shocks that may be more general than the e¤ects captured by the OPEC membership dummy.
Table 5 shows that the results for the simple test (columns (1)-(2)) are not robust to adding
time e¤ects, although the signs on the Partnership coe¢ cient remain positive. However, the
extended test in columns (3)-(4) remains consistent, particularly as regards the signicance
of the Partnership variable, although the size of the coe¢ cients does diminish with respect to
Table 4. Similarly, labor productivity remains positive and highly signicant, but its magnitude
decreases. Neither the polity variable nor the measure of executive restraints (not shown) proves
very robust to controlling for time e¤ects, with polity even changing signs in the extended test
(column (4)).
Second, we substitute years of schooling for labor productivity as the proxy for the level of
technology: Table 7 in the Appendix reports the results of the specications corresponding to
the ones in Table 4. The ndings are generally weaker, although both Partnership and Foreign
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Table 6: Prediction 2: protability and control regimes
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Foreign Partnership Foreign Partnership Foreign Partnership Foreign Partnership
(regime=2)(regime=3) (regime=2)(regime=3) (regime=2)(regime=3) (regime=2)(regime=3)
oil reserves share 0.306** 0.297** 0.260* 0.240* 0.516** 0.511** 0.555** 0.496*
(2.509) (2.269) (1.894) (1.706) (2.135) (2.057) (2.095) (1.837)
oil price -0.0235** -0.009 -0.023* -0.020
(-2.553) (-1.148) (-1.806) (-1.350)
OPEC -0.736 1.985** -1.957 -0.510
(-0.559) (2.248) (-0.807) (-0.208)
polity 0.111*** 0.0395 0.080** -0.011
(3.885) (1.566) (1.976) (-0.227)
labor productivity 0.008 -0.037** -0.042* -0.07**
(0.563) (-2.459) (-1.706) (-2.375)
lag regime 3.787*** 6.496*** 3.954*** 6.026***
(7.74) (11.01) (6.224) (8.343)
Constant 0.752*** 0.694*** 1.005** 1.396*** -4.862*** -11.46*** -3.720*** -8.080***
-4.516 -4.12 (2.225) (3.303) (-7.067) (-10.94) (-4.338) (-6.759)
Observations 476 476 414 414 458 458 397 397
Log likelihood -371.2 -371.2 -286.0 -286.0 -204.9 -204.9 -161.1 -161.1
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.63
Chi2 286.01 286.01 323.9 323.9 580.86 580.86 537.7 537.7
Notes : All estimations are pooled multinomial logit with dummies for top 20 oil countries included (not shown).
The dependent variable is control regime, which ranges from 1 (Domestic) over 2 (Foreign) to 3 (Partnership).
Domestic Control (=regime 1) is base outcome; the results show the log probability of choosing either Foreign or
Partnership over Domestic. z-statistics in parentheses. , ,  statistically signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
Control lead to higher predicted incomes than Domestic Control. However, the coe¢ cients
are not always signicant, particularly when using robust country-clustered standard errors.
Moreover, Foreign Control appears to have higher positive e¤ects than Partnership, although
the di¤erence in the magnitudes of the two coe¢ cients is not statistically signicant.
Summing up the empirical ndings for Prediction 1, we can say that it is clearly supported
both in the simple and the extended versions: Partnership leads to higher income than Foreign
Control, and moreover both Partnership and Foreign Control lead to higher income than Do-
mestic Control. We believe that this result is quite remarkable and lends a lot of credence to
the theoretical model.
Prediction 2. Table 6 shows the ndings for the test of Prediction 2 using multinomial
logit, where Domestic Control (regime=1) is the base outcome. The coe¢ cients on the relative
protability measure therefore give the log probability of choosing either Foreign (regime=2)
or Partnership (regime=3) over Domestic. Estimation (1) shows a parsimonious specication
with only the oil reserves share, our proxy for relative protability, and the dummies for the top
20 oil countries. Estimation (2) includes further control variables, and estimations (3) and (4)
add the lagged dependent variable to focus only on the transition to a control regime, without
considering its persistence.
The main result is that the log probability of choosing either Foreign or Partnership over
Domestic Control increases with an increase in the oil reserves share, and hence in the relative
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protability: this is in line with the theoretical predictions. It is ambiguous whether Foreign
Control or Partnership is linked to highest (or intermediate) relative protability: although
the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients suggest that it may be Foreign, a simple Wald test shows
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are the same in all estimations. This
however does not contradict the model, which predicts that either Foreign or Partnership will
be associated with high relative protability, while intermediate relative protability is most
likely associated with Partnership.
The control variables show some interesting results. An increasing oil price decreases the
chances of having either Foreign or Partnership instead of Domestic Control, which probably
lies in the greater temptation for nationalizing an increasingly lucrative industry. The polity
measure shows opposing e¤ects: it increases the likelihood of choosing Partnership over Do-
mestic, but decreases the likelihood of having Foreign Control instead of Domestic, although
the e¤ects are not very strong. The alternative political measure executive constraints gave no
signicant results (not shown). Technology levels measured by either labor productivity or
schooling years (not shown) tend to negatively a¤ect the likelihood of any foreign involvement,
either under majority Foreign Control or Partnership. Finally, the highly signicant coe¢ cient
on the lagged dependent variable shows that there is indeed path dependency in control rights
regimes: the likelihood of switching regimes is small.
In additional robustness tests in Table 8 (see the Appendix), we rst conne the sample to
the post-1970 period, and then to the post-1980 period, for which we have the most complete
and reliable oil reserves data. This aims at checking whether the results crucially depend on a
particular time span. In both cases, Partnership is consistently and signicantly linked to higher
relative protability when we take into account the persistence of control regimes (estimations
(2) and (4)) and is otherwise insignicant, though still positive. Foreign instead sometimes
changes signs, becoming the least likely outcome as relative protability increases (estimations
(1) and (3)). We also drop Saudi Arabia and the United States (estimations (5)-(6)), two
possible outliers which may be unduly inuencing our results. Both Foreign and Partnership
still have a consistent and signicant higher log probability of being the observed outcome with
growing relative protability than Domestic.
In sum, the empirical results for Prediction 2 conrm that either Foreign Control or Partner-
ship are the more likely control regimes when a countrys oil sector is relatively highly protable,
with either one being chosen instead of Domestic Control.
6 Conclusions
Understanding the impact of di¤erent regimes of property and control rights on economic per-
formance is a fundamental question in economics. The quantitative analysis of the e¤ects of
control rights on income levels, in particular, has substantial implications for policymaking.
Our analysis provides a theoretical basis and strong empirical support for two hypotheses con-
cerning the role of control rights over the exploitation of critical resources. First, international
partnerships in which the investment choices of foreign rms are constrained by the decisions
of domestic (public) managers tend to generate higher domestic income than regimes of pure
foreign control. Second, the typical control regime that arises as a bargaining equilibrium is
either partnership or foreign control when the international relative protability of the domestic
resource endowment is high or intermediate, and home control with low relative protability.
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In our analysis, the key mechanism through which control regimes a¤ect economic activ-
ity is the non-contractibility of investment before resource extraction takes place. From the
empirical point of view, this is an important element in the negotiations because extractive in-
dustries require high investment before production begins (see e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1983).
Nonetheless, there might be alternative mechanisms that reinforce our main conclusions while
capturing other relevant aspects of control regimes e.g., the fact that foreign rms are more
subject to the threat of rent-extracting royalties under pure foreign control than under partner-
ships. Also, our results concerning the degree of residual rights on local capital to be granted
to foreign rms deserve attention. In our model, assigning complete residual rights to foreign
rms is ine¢ cient for the allocation of local capital in the host country and yields negative
e¤ects on total domestic income. The idea that there exists an optimal degree of residual rights
suggests that there are strategic interactions between the choice of the regime and the extent
to which foreign rms are allowed to exploit the domestic inputs required to extract resources.
Addressing this issue is an interesting topic for future research.
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A Appendix Empirical Evidence
A.1 Additional tables
Table 7: Extended Prediction 1: ownership structures and income levels, controlling for years
of schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
partnership 0.099 0.112 0.127 0.096 0.111
(1.19) (1.37) (1.61) (1.16) (1.38)
[2.20] [2.52] [2.69] [2.26] [2.40]
foreign 0.101 0.137* 0.181** 0.102 0.145*
(1.22) (1.76) (2.30) (1.24) (1.72)
[1.45] [1.90] [3.02] [1.49] [2.58]
schooling years 0.12*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.118***
(4.99) (4.63) (4.58) (4.97) (4.94)
[4.23] [4.10] [4.29] [4.22] [4.47]
polity -0.009 -0.008
(-1.54) (-1.47)
(-2.13) [-2.06]
executive constraints 0.001* 0.001*
(1.82) (1.81)
[1.47] [1.26]
OPEC 0.450*** 0.446***
(4.62) (4.31)
[5.10] [4.94]
constant 7.745 7.687 7.591 7.746 7.649
(64.46) (54.94) (57.31) (64.40) (66.63)
[40.19] [36.88] [41.06] [40.51] [45.68]
Observations 481 479 479 481 481
Countries 55 55 55 55 55
Ave obs per country 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7
R2 within 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.32
Notes : All countries in sample are included. Domestic ownership is base outcome. The dependent variable is (log)
income per capita at start of ve-year period. All covariates except the OPEC dummy are lagged by one period.
Estimations are xed e¤ects (within) panel estimations. t-statistics for robust country-clustered standard errors
are in parentheses, and for Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in square brackets. , ,  statistically signicant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (refers to robust country-clustered standard errors).
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A.2 Data description
Countries for which control rights regime data is available, with period included
(starting with beginning of rst ve-year period):
Albania (1930-2008), Algeria (1965-2008), Angola (1980-2008), Argentina (1910-2008), Aus-
tralia (1905-2008), Azerbaijan (1995-2008), Bahrain (1975-2008), Bolivia (1920-2008), Brazil
(1895-2008), Brunei (1985-2008), Cameroon (1965-2008), Canada (1870-2008), Chad (1965-
2008), Chile (1930-2008), China (1950-2008), Colombia (1915-2008), Congo Brazzaville (1965-
2008), Cuba (1955-2008), Denmark (1950-2008), East Timor (2005-2008), Ecuador (1910-
2008), Egypt (1955-2008), Equatorial Guinea (1980-2008), France (1925-2008), Gabon (1965-
2008), Germany (1990-2008), West Germany (1955-1989), Guatemala (1950-2008), India (1955-
2008), Indonesia (1960-2008), Iran (1905-2008), Iraq (1955-2008), Italy (1930-2008), Kaza-
khstan (1995-2008), Kuwait (1965-2008), Libya (1955-2008), Malaysia (1970-2008), Mexico
(1905-2008), Netherlands (1965-2008), Nigeria (1965-2008), Norway (1965-2008), Oman (1975-
2008), Pakistan (1950-2008), Papua New Guinea (1980-2008), Peru (1925-2008), Philippines
(1950-2008), Qatar (1975-2008), Romania (1895-2008), Imperial Russia (1875-1918), Russian
Federation (1995-2008), Saudi Arabia (1935-2008), Sudan (1975-2008), Syria (1955-2008), Thai-
land (1975-2008), Trinidad and Tobago (1965-2008), Tunisia (1960-2008), Turkey (1930-2008),
Turkmenistan (1995-2008), United Arab Emirates (1980-2008), Ukraine (2005-2008), United
Kingdom (1935-2008), United States (1900-2008), USSR (1920-2008), Uzbekistan (1995-2008),
Venezuela (1905-2008), Vietnam (1985-2008), Yemen (1990-2008), North Yemen (1975-1990),
South Yemen (1980-1990).
Data and sources
income per capita: natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1990 international Geary-Khamis
(PPP-adjusted) dollars. Source: Maddison (2006).
oil control rights regime: oil sector control rights variable categorized into majority domestic,
majority foreign, or majority mixed domestic-foreign (i.e. partnership) control, according
to description in text. Source: own coding.
oil reserves share: Share of total proved oil reserves (in million barrels) of sample in percent.
Countries with less than 50 million barrels production were assigned reserves of 25 million
(Thailand 1980-83, Vietnam 1987). Source: BP (2010) for most countries since 1980; for
earlier years Jenkins (1989); UK Institute of Geological Sciences (IGS) World Mineral Sta-
tistics (since 1970) and Statistical Summary of the Mineral Industry: World Production,
Exports and Imports (since 1950s); Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohsto¤e
(2003 and 2007) conventional oil reserves for Albania, Bahrain, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad,
Cuba, France, Germany, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine (most 1995-2001 and 2005);
Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohsto¤e (1989) conventional oil reserves for
years 1970, 1975, some countries also 1980, 1985-88.
oil price: average oil price over previous ve-year period in constant 2009 US dollars. Source:
BP (2010).
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polity: revised Combined Polity Score. This variable modies the combined annual POLITY
score by applying a simple treatment, or x, to convert instances of standardized
authority scores (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores, i.e., within the
range, -10 (strong autocracy) to +10(strong democracy). Source: Polity IV database
(Marshall et al. 2010).
executive constraints: measure of the decision rules that dene the extent of institutionalized
constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether individuals or col-
lectivities. The measure ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or
subordination). Source: Polity IV database (Marshall et al. 2010).
OPEC: dummy variable with value one in a period when a country is a member of the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Source: own coding based on OPEC
information on http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/.
labor productivity: labor productivity per person employed in thousands of 1990 US$ (con-
verted at Geary Khamis PPPs), average over previous ve-year period. Source: The
Conference Board Total Economy Database (2011).
years of schooling: Average years of total schooling of population over previous ve-year period.
Source: Barro Lee education dataset v. 2.0, 07/10 (Barro and Lee, 2010).
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B Appendix Theoretical Model with Conscation
Nash Bargaining: derivation of (11)-(12). From (5) and (6), we have
Sf  Df = `f   (qxh (kf )  sh) ;
Sp  Dp = `p   (qxh (kp) + rpkp   sh) ;
Fi  i = qxi (ki) 0   `i for i = (f; p) :
Hence, dening

f  qxh (kf )  sh and 
p  qxh (kp) + rpkp   sh; (B.1)
we can write the Nash product in (10) for each regime i = (f; p) as
(Si  Di)  (Fi  i) = (`i   
i)  (qxi (ki) 0   `i) =
= `i  (qxi (ki) 0 +
i)  `2i   
i  (qxi (ki) 0) ;
and obtain the rst-order condition for maximization
`Ni =
1
2
 (qxi (ki) 0 +
i) : (B.2)
Plugging `i = `Ni into the denitions of domestic income, Yf and Yp, in Table 1, we obtain
Y Nf = qzzf + rfkf +
1
2
  qxf (kf ) 0 +
f ;
Y Np = qzzp +
1
2
  qxp (kp) 0 +
p ;
where we can substitute 
f and 
p from (B.1) to get
Y Nf = qzzf +
1
2
 qxf (kf ) + qxh (kf )  sh  0 + 2rfkf  ; (B.3)
Y Np = qzzp +
1
2
 qxp (kp) + qxh (kp)  sh  0 + rpkp : (B.4)
From (6), we have
Df  f = qxh (kf )  sh  0 + sf + rfkf ; (B.5)
Dp  p = qxh (kp)  sh  0 + sp: (B.6)
Substituting (B.5) and (B.6) in (B.3) and (B.4), respectively, we obtain
Y Ni = qzzi +
1
2
 [qxi (ki) + riki +Di  i   si]
in both cases i = (f; p). Substituting zi   (kmax   ki) in the above expression and rearranging
terms, we have result (11). Next, we substitute `i = `Ni from (B.2) into the denitions of prots,
f and p, in Table 1, obtaining
Nf = qxf (kf )  sf   rfkf  
1
2
 qxf (kf ) 0 +
f  ;
Np = qxp (kp)  sp  
1
2
 qxp (kp) 0 +
p ;
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where we can substitute 
f and 
p from (B.1) to get
Nf =
1
2
 qxf (kf )  2sf   2rfkf +0   qxh (kf ) + sh ; (B.7)
Np =
1
2
 qxp (kp)  2sp +0   qxh (kp)  rpkp + sh : (B.8)
Plugging (B.5) and (B.6) in (B.7) and (B.8), respectively, we obtain result (12) in both cases
i = (f; p).
Proof of Proposition 1. Under Foreign Control, the expected level of foreign rms prots
after bargaining, Nf , is given by (12) and can be re-written as in (B.7) above. Maximizing
(B.7) with respect to kf taking the rental rate rf as given yields the rst order condition (13).
Under Partnership, the expected level of domestic income after bargaining Y Np is given by (11)
and can be re-written as in (B.4), or equivalently,
Y Np = qz (kmax   kp) +
1
2
 qxp (kp) + qxh (kp)  sh  0 + rpkp : (B.9)
Maximizing (B.9) with respect to kp taking the rental rate rp as given yields the rst order
condition (14) and thereby (15). 
Proof of Proposition 2. From (9), (B.3) and (B.4), equilibrium incomes read
Y ?h = qz (kmax   k?h) + qxh (k?h)  sh; (B.10)
Y ?f = qz(kmax   k?f ) +
1
2
 qxf (k?f ) + qxh(k?f )  sh  0 + 2r?fk?f  ; (B.11)
Y ?p = qz
 
kmax   k?p

+
1
2
 qxp  k?p+ qxh  k?p  sh  0 + r?pk?p : (B.12)
From (8), (13) and (15), the rents paid by the commodity sector equal
r?hk
?
h =   qx (k?h) ; (B.13)
r?fk
?
f =
1
2
('2   '1)    qx (k?f ); (B.14)
r?pk
?
p = ('2 + '1)    qx 
 
k?p

: (B.15)
Combining (B.13)-(B.15) with the demand for local capital of the traditional sector (3), and
using (4), we have the equilibrium levels
k?h = [(qx=qz) (=)  '1]
1
1  ; (B.16)
k?f =

(qx=qz) (=)  1
2
('2   '1)
 1
1 
; (B.17)
k?p = [(qx=qz) (=)  ('2 + '1)]
1
1  : (B.18)
From (B.7) and (B.8), the equilibrium prots of the foreign rms read
?f =
1
2
 qxf (k?f )  2sf   2r?fk?f +0   qxh(k?f ) + sh ; (B.19)
?p =
1
2
 qxp  k?p  2sp   r?pk?p +0   qxh  k?p+ sh : (B.20)
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Expressions (B.17)-(B.18) imply k?p > k
?
f and, by technologies (4), this implies x
?
p > x
?
f . The
rest of the proof proceeds in three steps: (i) ranking domestic incomes, (ii) ranking foreign
rms prots, (iii) deriving the loci 0 and 1 as increasing functions of .
(i) Ranking Domestic Income Levels. Recalling that r?i k
?
i = qzk
?
i in any regime i due to the
equilibrium condition (3), and using the technologies (4), equations (B.11) and (B.12) imply
Y ?f = qzkmax +
1
2 
h
qx ('2 + '1) (k
?
f )
   sh  0
i
;
Y ?p = qzkmax +
1
2 
h
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?p
   r?pk?p   sh  0i ; (B.21)
from which, exploiting (B.15), we get
Y ?p   Y ?f =
1
2
qx ('2 + '1) 
h
(1  )  k?p   (k?f )i : (B.22)
From (B.22), the gap Y ?p   Y ?f is positive (negative) when the term in square brackets, or
equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio, ln[(1  ) (k?p=k?f )], is positive (negative).
Using (B.17)-(B.18) to substitute for capital levels, we have
ln[(1  ) (k?p=k?f )] = ln
"
(1  )

2
'2 + '1
'2   '1
 
1 
#
= ln (1  ) + 
1   ln

2
'2 + '1
'2   '1

;
which is positive if and only if
(1  ) ln (1  ) +  ln

2
'2 + '1
'2   '1

> 0: (B.23)
Dening the productivity-gap index   '2='1 > 1, we can re-write inequality (B.23) as
1 (; )   ln

2   + 1
   1

> 2 ()    ln (1  )1  : (B.24)
Holding  xed, functions 1 (; ) and 2 () are graphically represented in Figure 3, graph
(a). In particular, holding  xed, function 1 (; ) is an increasing straight line satisfying
lim
!0
1 (; ) = 0 and
@
@
1 (; ) = ln

2   + 1
   1

; (B.25)
whereas 2 () is a hump-shaped function satisfying
lim!0 2 () = 0; lim!1 2 () = 0;
@
@2 () = ln (1  ) + 1; @
2
@2
2 () =   (1  ) 1 < 0;
lim!0 @@2 () = 1; lim!0
@2
@2
2 () =  1:
(B.26)
First, we determine the critical threshold 0. Properties (B.25) and (B.26) imply that, if 1 ()
is steeper than 2 () in  ! 0, then the two functions 1 (; ) and 2 () do not cross: we
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would have 1 (; ) > 2 () for any  2 (0; 1) and, hence, Y ?p > Y ?f for any  2 (0; 1). From
(B.25) and (B.26), having
lim
!0
@
@
1 (; ) > lim
!0
@
@
2 ()
requires satisfying ln

2  +1 1

> 1, that is, requires satisfying
 <
e+ 2
e  2  0  6:7: (B.27)
Hence, satisfying the inequality  < 0 ensures that Y
?
p > Y
?
f for any  2 (0; 1). Now suppose
that  > 0. In this case, we have
lim
!0
@
@
1 (; ) < lim
!0
@
@
2 () ;
which implies that there exists an intersection 1 (; ) = 2 () such that 1 (; ) cuts 2 ()
from below, as shown in Figure 3, graph (a). Consequently, when  > 0, there exists a unique
value of , which we denote by 0 2 (0; 1), such that
1 (; ) = 2 () for  = 0, and 1 (; ) Q 2 () for  Q 0:
This implies that, when  > 0, we have Y
?
p > Y
?
f for  > 0, and Y
?
p 6 Y ?f for  6 0.
(ii) Ranking Foreign Firms Prots. Using the technologies (4), equations (B.19) and (B.20)
imply
?f =
1
2 
h
qx ('2   '1) (k?f )   2r?fk?f   2sf +0 + sh
i
;
?p =
1
2 
h
qx ('2   '1) 
 
k?p
   r?pk?p   2sp +0 + shi ; (B.28)
where, setting sf = sp and using (B.14) and (B.15) to eliminate r?i k
?
i , we get
?f  ?p =
1
2
qx 
n
(1  ) ('2   '1) (k?f )   [('2   '1)   ('2 + '1)]
 
k?p
o
: (B.29)
Equation (B.29) already contains a critical condition on parameters: if  > '2 '1'2+'1 , the term in
square brackets is negative, implying ?f > 
?
p. Exploiting the denition   '2='1 > 1, we
can re-write this result as
 >  ()     1
 + 1
=) ?f > ?p: (B.30)
Bearing result (B.30) in mind, the remainder of the proof focuses on the case  <  (). When
 <  (), the prot gap ?f ?p is positive (negative) if and only if the term in square brackets,
or equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio
ln
"
(1  ) ('2   '1)
('2   '1)   ('2 + '1)

k?f
k?p
#
; (B.31)
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is positive (negative). Using (B.17)-(B.18) to substitute for capital levels, and exploiting the
denitions of  and  (), expression (B.31) becomes
ln

(1 )('2 '1)
('2 '1) ('2+'1)

'2 '1
2('2+'1)
 
1 

= ln

 1 ( 1)
 1 (+1)

1
2   1+1
 
1 

=
= ln

 ()  1 ()  

1
2
 ()
 
1 

;
which is positive if and only if
3 (; )  ln
 
 ()

+ (1  ) ln

1  
 ()  

> 4 ()   ln (2) : (B.32)
Holding  xed (which implies that  () is xed), function 4 () is an increasing straight line
satisfying
lim
!0
4 () = 0 and
@
@
4 () = ln (2) ; (B.33)
whereas function 3 (; ) is an increasing convex function displaying
lim!0 3 (; ) = 0; lim!() 3 (; ) = +1;
@
@3 (; ) =
1 ()
()    ln

1 
() 

; @
2
@2
3 (; ) =
1+
(() )2
+ 11  > 0
lim!0 @@3 (; ) =
1 ()
()
+ ln  () > 0; lim!()
@
@3 (; ) = +1:
(B.34)
Functions 3 (; ) and 4 () are graphically represented in Figure 3, graph (d). First, we
determine the critical threshold 1. Properties (B.33) and (B.34) imply that, if 3 (; ) is
steeper than 4 () in  ! 0, then the two functions 3 (; ) and 4 () do not cross: we
would have 3 (; ) > 4 () for any  2
 
0;  ()

and, hence, ?f > 
?
p for any  2
 
0;  ()

.
From (B.33) and (B.34), having
lim
!0
@
@
3 (; ) > lim
!0
@
@
4 ()
requires satisfying 1 
()
()
+ ln  () > ln (2), that is, requires satisfying
 + 1
   1 + ln

   1
 + 1

| {z }
()
> 1 + ln (2) : (B.35)
The right hand side of (B.35) is independent of  whereas the left hand side of (B.35), denoted as
 (), is a decreasing hyperbula satisfying lim!1 () =1, lim!1 () = 1, and 0 () < 0
for each  2 (1;1). Consequently, there exists a unique critical level of , which we denote by
1 2 (1;1), such that
 (1) = 1 + ln (2) and  (1) R 1 + ln (2) for  Q 1: (B.36)
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Result (B.36) is graphically represented in Figure 3, graph (c). Note that the critical level 1
is exclusively determined by the condition  (1) = 1+ ln (2) and its value only depends on the
elasticity of the logarithmic curve. We can thus denote it as 1    (e). In numerical terms,
the value of 1    (e) is determined graphically in Figure 3, graph (c) and is equal to
1    (e)  2:2:
Result (B.36) implies that, for any  < 1, inequality (B.35) is satised and, consequently,
?f > 
?
p must hold:
 < 1 =)  () > 1 + ln (2) =) lim
!0
@
@
3 (; ) > lim
!0
@
@
4 () =) :::
=) 3 (; ) > 4 () for any  2
 
0;  ()

=) ?f > ?p for any  2
 
0;  ()

:(B.37)
Instead, if  > 1,we have  () < 1 + ln (2). In this case, 3 (; ) is less steep than 4 () in
 ! 0 and there exists a unique intersection between the functions 3 (; ) and 4 (). This
is shown in Figure 3, graph (d): for a given value of  > 1, there exists a unique value of ,
which we denote by 1 2
 
0;  ()

, such that 3 (1; ) = 4 (1). Since function 3 (; )
cuts 4 () from below in  = 1, it follows that
 > 1 =)

3 (; ) < 4 () for any  2 (0; 1)
3 (; ) > 4 () for any  2
 
1;
 ()
  =) :::
::: =)

?f < 
?
p for any  2 (0; 1)
?f > ?p for any  2
 
1;
 ()
  : (B.38)
Combining results (B.30), (B.37) and (B.38), we obtain the full ranking of foreign rms prots.
Specically, combining (B.30) and (B.37), we have that  < 1 implies 
?
f > 
?
p for any
 2 (0; 1). Combining (B.30) and (B.38), we have that, if  > 1, there exists a critical level
1 2

0;  1+1

such that ?f < 
?
p when 0 <  < 1, and 
?
f > 
?
p when 1 <  < 1.
(iii) Deriving the loci 0 and 1 as increasing functions of . First consider the 0 ()
locus. For given , the critical level 0 () is determined by condition 1 (; ) = 2 (). As
shown in Figure 3, graph (b), an increase in  leaves 2 () una¤ected whereas the straight line
1 (; ) rotates clockwise around the origin  = 0. As a consequence,
0 () is strictly increasing in  for any  2 (1;1) : (B.39)
However, the rotation of 1 (; ) exhibits decreased intensity as  becomes high. Letting
 !1, we have
lim
!11 (; )   ln (2)
so that the condition 1 (; ) = 2 () determining 0 reduces (asymptotically as  !1) to:
lim
!10 = arg solve
n
ln
h
(2)0 (1  0)(1 0)
i
= 0
o
= 0:5: (B.40)
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Results (B.39)-(B.40) imply that the critical level 0 can be represented as an increasing locus
0 () bounded from above by 0:5. The locus is graphically represented in Figure 1 for the
range  2 (0; 10). The enlarged picture with  2 (0; 100) is reported in Figure 3, graph (f).
Next consider the 1 () locus, with the help of Figure 3, graph (e). For given , the critical
level 1 () is determined by condition 3 (; ) = 4 (). An increase in  leaves 4 ()
una¤ected. Instead, the e¤ect of an increase in  on 3 (; ) is twofold. First, the vertical
asymptote  () shifts to the right; second, the convex curve 3 (; ) rotates clockwise around
the origin  = 0. Formally, from (B.30) and (B.32), we have

0
()  @ () =@ = 2  ( + 1) 2 > 0;
@
@
3 (; ) =    

0
() 
 ()     () < 0:
As shown in Figure 3, graph (e), these e¤ects imply that, following an increase in , the
intersection point 1 () shifts to the right, that is,
1 () is strictly increasing in  for any  2 (1;1) : (B.41)
Moreover, following an increase in , the intersection point 1 () becomes closer to the asymp-
tote  (). Since lim!1  () = 1, we thus obtain
lim
!11 () = 1: (B.42)
Results (B.41)-(B.42) imply that the critical level 1 can be represented as an increasing locus
1 () bounded from above by 1. The locus is graphically represented in Figure 1 for the range
 2 (0; 10). The enlarged picture with  2 (0; 100) is reported in Figure 3, graph (f). 
Further details on Figure 1. The loci 0 () and 1 () appearing in Figure 1 originate
from two simple algorithms that calculate
0 ()  arg solve f1 (; ) = 2 ()g and
1 ()  arg solve f3 (; ) = 4 ()g (B.43)
for each value of  2 (0; 10). The shape of both loci is characterized analytically in step (iii) of
the Proof of Proposition 2 above. The intuition for these results is as follows.
Concerning the 0 () locus, it follows from (B.22) that the income gap Y
?
p   Y ?f is positive
when (1  ) (k?p=k?f ) > 1. Here, (1  ) represents the negative rent e¤ect, and (k?p=k?f )
represents the positive accumulation e¤ect of Partnership relative to Foreign Control (see
the main text, below Proposition 2). Now, the equilibrium conditions (B.17)-(B.18) imply that
(k?p=k
?
f )
 decreases with  and increases logarithmically with . Consequently, a su¢ ciently
high  combined with a su¢ ciently low  yield (k?p=k
?
f )
 < (1  ) 1 and therefore Y ?p < Y ?f .
Concerning the 1 () locus, the intuition is twofold. On the one hand, an increase in 
increases the rental cost born by the foreign rm more than it increases commodity production
45
under Foreign Control relative to Partnership; this implies ?p > 
?
f for high values of .
31 On
the other hand, an increase in  reduces the joint surplus more under Partnership than under
Foreign Control because the State (foreign rm) overinvests (underinvest) in local capital, and
this implies ?p > 
?
f for low values of .
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Proof of Proposition 3 (graphical). The proof hinges on the fact that the 0 () locus
always lies below the 1 () locus in the (; ) plane. A rst, quicker proof is graphical. From
Figure 1, the strict inequality 1 () > 0 () holds for and  6 0 where 0 is such that
1 (
0) = 0:5. Combining these properties with the limits (B.40) and (B.42) as well with the
fact that both 0 () and 1 () are strictly increasing in  from (B.39) and (B.41), it follows
that the strict inequality 1 (
00) > 0 (00) holds for any 00 2 (1;1). As a consequence, there
is no region of the parameter space (; ) in which Y ?p < Y
?
f and 
?
p < 
?
f hold symultaneously.
The proof that the parametrization sets (A;B;C) are non-empty follows immediately from
Figure 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (analytical). An alternative, longer but analytical proof that
1 (
00) > 0 (00) holds for any 00 2 (1;1) is as follows. Substituting the denitions of
(1,2,3,4) from (B.24) and (B.32) into expressions (B.43), the two loci 0 () and 1 ()
are determined by
0 ()  arg solve
n
 ln (2) = ln

 ()
  ln  ()  (1  )1 o ; (B.44)
1 ()  arg solve
n
 ln (2) = ln

 ()

+ ln

(1  ) =   ()  1 o : (B.45)
Given the properties (B.39)-(B.40) and (B.41)-(B.42), a su¢ cient condition for having 1 (
00) >
0 (
00) for any 00 2 (1;1) is that 0 () and 1 () do not exhibit any intersection. We
now prove that prove that 0 () and 1 () do not exhibit any intersection. The proof is by
contradiction. Suppose that 0 () = 0 (). From (B.44)-(B.45), this would require that
  ln  ()  (1  )1  = ln (1  ) =   ()  1  ; (B.46)
which is possible if and only if  is such that
 =  =)  () =  ()  
1  (1  )2 : (B.47)
31To see this formally, note that, from (B.17)-(B.18), the equilibrium output ratio is x?f=x
?
p =

1
2
  1
+1
 
1 
,
whereas the ratio between the shares of investment costs born ex-post by the foreign rms (that reduce ex-
post prots) is (2r?fk
?
f )=(r
?
pk
?
p) =
 1
+1

1
2
  1
+1
 
1 
. Consequently, an increase in  yields an increase in
(2r?fk
?
f )=(r
?
pk
?
p) that more than o¤sets the increase in (x
?
f=x
?
p), thus favoring prots under Partnership relative
to prots under Foreign Control.
32To see this formally, note that, from (B.29), the prot gap ?f   ?p is positive if and only ifh
('2 '1) ('2 '1)
('2 '1) ('2+'1)
i
 x
?
f
x?p
> 1, where the term in square brackets is the ratio between the shares of joint sur-
plus received by the foreign rm. An increase in the capital share  increases the term in square brackets that
is, reduces ex-post prots more under Partnership than under Foreign Control because ('2 + '1) > ('2   '1),
where the factor ('2 + '1) comes from the bargaining-power term that boosts investment under Partnership in
eq.(14) while the factor ('2   '1) comes from the bargaining-power term that reduces investment under Foreign
Control in eq. (13).
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However, when  = , both the equalities inside the curly brackets in (B.44)-(B.45) determining
0 () and 1 () are violated: substituting  () =

1 (1 )2 in either equality we obtain
ln (2) =
1

ln

(1  )1  ; (B.48)
which is absurd because ln (2) > 1 ln

(1 )1  for any  2 (0; 1).
33 The impossibility of sat-
isfying (B.48) implies that the loci 0 () and 1 () do not exhibit any intersection. Given
the properties (B.39)-(B.40) and (B.41)-(B.42), it follows that 1 (
00) > 0 (00) holds for any
00 2 (1;1). Consequently, there is no region of the parameter space (; ) in which Y ?p < Y ?f
and ?p < 
?
f hold symultaneously. The proof that the parametrization sets (A;B;C) are
non-empty follows immediately from Figure 1. 
Derivation of result (16). The proof consists of four steps, numbered (i)-(iv).
(i) Derivation of the upper bound yp0 . From(B.10) and (B.12), using the technologies (2)
and (4) and the equilibrium conditions ri = qz, we obtain the income gap
Y ?p   Y ?h =
1
2

h
qx ('2 + '1)
 
k?p
   r?pk?pi  hqx '1 (k?h)   r?hk?hi  12 (0   sh) ;
where we can substitute r?hk
?
h and r
?
pk
?
p by (B.13) and (B.15), obtaining
Y ?p   Y ?h = qx (1  ) 

1
2
('2 + '1)
 
k?p
   '1 (k?h)  12 (0   sh) : (B.49)
From (B.16) and (B.18), we have k?h = ['1= ('2 + '1)]
1
1  k?p, which can be substituted in
(B.49), along with k?p from (B.18), to obtain
Y ?p   Y ?h = qx (1  )
 
k?p
 ('2 + '1
2
  '1

'1
'2 + '1
 
1 
)
  1
2
(0   sh) ;
Y ?p   Y ?h = qx (1  )
 
k?p
  '1
(
 + 1
2
 

1
 + 1
 
1 
)
  1
2
(0   sh) ;
Y ?p   Y ?h = qx (1  ) [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1 
1
2
h
( + 1)
1
1    2
i
  1
2
(0   sh) :(B.50)
This implies that the State prefers Partnership to Home Control if and only if
0 < 
yp
0  sh +

qx (1  ) [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1


h
( + 1)
1
1    2
i
; (B.51)
that is, if and only if
0 < 
yp
0  sh +Q 
h
( + 1)
1
1    2
i
; (B.52)
33Specically, the right hand side of (B.48) is a hump-shaped function  over  2 (0; 1); it reaches a maximum
in   0:8, where it takes the value 1

ln 

(1 )1   0:18, which is strictly less than ln (2)  0:69.
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where Q is dened as the term in curly brackets in (B.51),
Q  qx (1  ) [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1 : (B.53)
(ii) Derivation of the upper bound p0 . From (B.20) or equivalently, the second expression
in (B.28), the foreign rm prefers Partnership to no initial contract, ?p > 0, if and only if
sh   2sp + qx ('2   '1)
 
k?p
   r?pk?p > 0;
where we can substitute r?pk
?
p from (B.15), and k
?
p from (B.18), to obtain
sh   2sp + qx '1 [   1   ( + 1)]
 
k?p

> 0;
sh   2sp + qx '1 [   1   ( + 1)] [(qx=qz) (=)  ('2 + '1)]

1  > 0;
sh   2sp + qx [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1 [   1   ( + 1)] ( + 1)

1  > 0;
that is, ?p > 0 if and only if
0 < 
p
0  sh   2sp +Q 
"
(   1) ( + 1) 1 
1    
 ( + 1)
1
1 
1  
#
: (B.54)
(iii) Derivation of the upper bound yf0 . From (B.11) and (B.12), using the technologies (2)
and (4) and the equilibrium conditions ri = qz, we obtain the income gap
Y ?f   Y ?h = qx 

1
2
('2 + '1)
 
k?f
   (1  )'1 (k?h)  12 (0   sh) : (B.55)
From (B.16) and (B.17), we have k?h = [2'1= ('2   '1)]
1
1  k?f , which can be substituted in
(B.55) to obtain
Y ?f   Y ?h = qx 
 
k?f
 "1
2
('2 + '1)  (1  )'1

2'1
'2   '1
 
1 
#
  1
2
(0   sh) ;
Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2
 qx 
 
k?f
 "
('2 + '1)  2 (1  )'1

2'1
'2   '1
 
1 
#
  1
2
(0   sh) ;
Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2
 qx 
 
k?f

'1
"
( + 1)  2 (1  )

2
   1
 
1 
#
  1
2
(0   sh) ;
where we can substitute k?f from (B.17) to obtain
Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2
 qx [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1
"
( + 1)

   1
2
 
1 
  2 (1  )
#
  1
2
(0   sh) ;
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where we can substitute the denition of Q to obtain
Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2
Q 
"
 + 1
1  

   1
2
 
1 
  2
#
  1
2
(0   sh) ; (B.56)
which implies that the State prefers Foreign Control to Home Control if and only if
0 < 
yf
0  sh +Q 
"
 + 1
1  

   1
2
 
1 
  2
#
: (B.57)
(iv) Derivation of the upper bound f0 . The second expression in (B.28) implies that the
Foreign Firm prefers Foreign Control to no initial contract, ?f > 0, if and only if
sh   2sf + qx ('2   '1) 
 
k?f
   2r?fk?f > 0;
where we can use (B.14) to substitute r?fk
?
f , obtaining
sh   2sf + qx ('2   '1) (1  )
 
k?f

> 0:
Eliminating k?f by (B.17), we have that 
?
f > 0 if and only if
sh   2sf + qx (1  ) [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1 (   1)
1
1 

1
2
 
1 
> 0;
that is, if and only if
0 < 
f
0  sh   2sf +Q 
"
(   1) 11 

1
2
 
1 
#
: (B.58)
Derivation of result (17). From (B.52) and (B.54), we have
yp0  p0 = 2sp +Q 
( + 1)
1
1  (1  )  2 (1  )  (   1) ( + 1) 1  +  ( + 1) 11 
1   ;
which reduces to
yp0  p0 = 2sp +Q 
2
1   
h
( + 1)

1    (1  )
i
> 0;
so that yp0 > 
p
0 . From (B.52) and (B.58) we have
yp0  f0 = 2sf +Q 
"
( + 1)
1
1    2  (   1) 11 

1
2
 
1 
#
;
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the sign of which is the same as that of
ln
"
2

1  ( + 1)
1
1    2
(   1) 11 
#
= ln
"
2

1 

 + 1
   1
 1
1 
 

2
   1
 1
1 
#
> 0;
which implies yp0 > 
f
0 for all constellations of parameters. Next, consider (B.52) and (B.54):
the gap yp0  p0 equals
yp0  p0 = Q 
h
( + 1)
1
1    2  ( + 1) 1  (   1)
i
+ 2sp;
where we can substitute ( + 1)

1  = ( + 1)
1
1  ( + 1) 1 and rearrange terms to get
yp0  p0 = Q 

( + 1)
1
1    2  ( + 1) 11 

   1
 + 1

+ 2sp;
yp0  p0 = Q 
n
( + 1)

1    1
o
+ 2sp;
where, given  > 1, the sign of the term in curly brackets is always positive. Hence, yp0 > 
p
0
for all constellations of parameters. 
Proof of the results listed in Table 2. The general logic is the following. If 0 lies
below the lowest of all upper-bounds, 0 < minfyp0 ;yf0 ;p0 ;f0 g, both Foreign Control and
Partnership are jointly agreeable: in this case, the choice of the regime depends on the assumed
values of (; ) and on the bargaining procedure followed at Stage 0, as explained in detail in
section 3.3.1. If 0 > minff0 ;yf0 g, we exclude Foreign Control as a candidate outcome as it
is not jointly agreeable. Similarly, we exclude Partnership if 0 > minfp0 ;yp0 g. The proof
of the results listed in Table 2 hinges on the following
Lemma 6 The three parametrization sets (A;B;C) are associated to the following inequalities:
A =) yp0 > yf0 and p0 > f0 ; (B.59)
B =) yf0 > yp0 and p0 > f0 ; (B.60)
C =) yp0 > yf0 and f0 > p0 ; (B.61)
Proof: Using the denitions of yp0 in (B.52), 
yf
0 in (B.57), 
p
0 in (B.54) and 
f
0 in (B.58),
expressions (B.50), (B.56), and (B.28) imply
Y ?p   Y ?h =
1
2
 fyp0  0g and Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2

n
yf0  0
o
; (B.62)
?p  0 =
1
2
 fp0  0g and ?f  0 =
1
2

n
f0  0
o
: (B.63)
Results (B.62) and (B.63) respectively imply that
Y ?p ? Y ?f =) yp0 ? yf0 ; (B.64)
?p ? ?f =) p0 ? f0 ; (B.65)
Combining (B.64) and (B.65) with the denitions of the parametrization sets (A;B;C), we
obtain results (B.59), (B.60) and (B.61).
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Given Lemma 6, the results reported in Table 2 can be obtained by considering each para-
metrization in turn.
Table 2: Parametrization A. Under parametrization A, the combination of results (17)
and (B.59) implies three possible cases:
A =)
8><>:
yp0 > 
p
0 > 
f
0 > 
yf
0
yp0 > 
p
0 > 
yf
0 > 
f
0
yp0 > 
yf
0 > 
p
0 > 
f
0
9>=>; :
This scenario is described in Figure 4, graphs (a)-(b)-(c). In all the three cases, both Partnership
and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable for low levels of the reservation prot; only Partnership
is jointly agreeable for intermediate levels of the reservation prot; only Home Control can arise
for high levels of the reservation prot, and is possibly jointly optimal.
Table 2: Parametrization B. Under parametrization A, the combination of results (17)
and (B.60) implies
B =) yf0 > yp0 > p0 > f0 :
Consequently, under ParametrizationB, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agree-
able if the reservation prot is low (0 < 
f
0 ); only Partnership is jointly agreeable if the reser-
vation prot takes intermediate levels (f0 < 0 < 
p
0 ); only Home Control can arise if the
reservation prot is high (0 > 
p
0 ); moreover, Home Control is jointly optimal if 0 > 
yf
0 .
Table 2: Parametrization C. Under parametrization C, the combination of results (17)
and (B.60) implies
C =)
8>><>>:
yp0 > 
f
0 > 
p
0 > 
yf
0
o
=) C1
yp0 > 
f
0 > 
yf
0 > 
p
0
yp0 > 
yf
0 > 
f
0 > 
p
0
)
=) C2
:
The subcase C1 is described in Figure 4, graph (d), whereas the subcases C2 are described
in Figure 4 graphs (e)-(f). In subcase C1, both Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly
agreeable if the reservation prot is low (0 < 
yf
0 ); only Partnership is jointly agreeable
if the reservation prot takes intermediate levels (yf0 < 0 < 
p
0 ). In subcases C2, both
Partnership and Foreign Control are jointly agreeable if the reservation prot is low (0 <
p0 ); only Foreign Control is jointly agreeable if the reservation prot takes intermediate levels
(min
n
yf0 ;
f
0
o
< 0 < 
p
0 ). In all cases, only Home Control can arise if the reservation
prot is high and is jointly optimal if 0 > 
yp
0 .
C Appendix Theoretical Model with Credible Repurchase
Derivation of (19)-(20). From (5) and (18), we have
Sf  Df = `f   (qxh (kf)  sh   rfkf) ;
Ff  f = qxf (kf) 0   rfkf   `f:
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Hence, dening

0f  qxh (kf)  sh   rfkf and 
00f  qxf (kf) 0   rfkf; (C.1)
we can write the relevant Nash product as
(Sf  Df)  (Ff  f) =
 
`f   
0f
   
00f   `f =
= `f
 

0f +

00
f
  `2f   
0f
00f
and obtain the rst-order condition for the maximization of the Nash product:
`Nf =
1
2
  
0f +
00f : (C.2)
Plugging `f = `Nf into the denitions of domestic income and prots, Yf and f in Table 1,
we obtain
Y Nf = qzzf + rfkf +
1
2
  
0f +
00f ;
Nf = qxf (kf)  sf   rfkf  
1
2
  
0f +
00f ;
where we can substitute 
0f and 

00
f from (C.1) to get (19) and (20).
Proof of results (21) and (22). At Stage 1, the foreign rm chooses k?f in order to
maximize ex-post prots (20). The rst order condition for an interior solution is (21). Under
technologies (2) and (4), condition (21) reads
qx ('2   '1) 
 
k?f
 1
= 2 (1  ) r?f; (C.3)
from which an interior solution 0 < k?f < kmax is characterized by
r?fk
?
f =
qx ('2   '1) 
2 (1  )
 
k?f

; (C.4)
k?f =

qx ('2   '1) 
2 (1  ) qz
 1
1 
; (C.5)
where (C.5) follows from substituting the equilibrium interest rate rf = qz in (C.3). Notice
that (C.5) implicitly denes the interior k?f as a function of  with the following properties:
lim
!0
k?f () = k
?
f (0) = k
?
f =

qx ('2   '1) 
2qz
 1
1 
; (C.6)
@k?f ()
@
=
1
(1  ) (1  )  k
?
f () > 0; (C.7)
where (C.7) further implies the convexity property @2k?f () =@ > 0. Since the term in square
brackets in (C.5) tends to 1 as ! 1, there must be a unique critical level max 2 (0; 1) such
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that
k?f (max) =

qx ('2   '1) 
2 (1  max) qz
 1
1 
= kmax <1; (C.8)
k?f
 
0

=
"
qx ('2   '1) 
2
 
1  0 qz
# 1
1 
< kmax for any 0 < max;
which implies result (22). In particular, expression (C.8) implies that the upper bound is given
by
max  1  qx ('2   '1) 
2qz (kmax)
1  ; (C.9)
and is therefore higher the higher is kmax.
Proof of Proposition 4. First consider the income function Y ?f () assuming that
 is always such that we have an interior solution. Substituting rf = qz and qzzf =
rf (kmax   kf) in (19), the equilibrium ex-post income level reads
Y ?f =
1
2
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?f
     r?fk?f + qzkmax   12 (sh +0) ;
from which, using (C.4) to substitute r?fk
?
f, we get
Y ?f =
1
2
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?f
    ('2   '1)
1   
1
2
qx 
 
k?f

+ qzkmax   1
2
(sh +0) : (C.10)
Combining (C.5) with (C.10), equilibrium income Y ?f can be represented as a function of ,
Y ?f () =
1
2
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?f ()
  
1   
1
2
qx  ('2   '1)
 
k?f ()

+qzkmax 1
2
(sh +0) :
Dening the constants
&0  1
2
qx ('2 + '1) and &1 
1
2
qx  ('2   '1) ; (C.11)
we have
Y ?f () =

&0   &1 
1  

  k?f () + qzkmax   12 (sh +0) : (C.12)
Di¤erentiating (C.12), we obtain
@Y ?f ()
@
=
@

&0   &1 1 

@
  k?f () + &0   &1 1  

   k?f () 1 @k?f ()@ ;
where we can substitute (C.7) to get
@Y ?f ()
@
=
24@

&0   &1 1 

@
+


&0   &1 1 

(1  ) (1  )
35   k?f () ;
@Y ?f ()
@
=
24

&0   &1 1 

(1  ) (1  )  
&1
(1  )2
35   k?f () ;
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and, hence,
@Y ?f ()
@
= [ (&0 + &1) (1  )  &1] 

k?f ()

(1  ) (1  )2 : (C.13)
The sign of @Y ?f () =@ is determined by the term in square brackets in (C.13). In particular,
there exists a critical value
~   (&0 + &1)  &1
 (&0 + &1)
(C.14)
such that @Y ?f () =@ R 0 if  Q ~. Consequently, Y ?f () achieves a maximum in  = ~.
Substituting (C.11) in (C.14), we obtain
~  ('2 + '1)  ('2   '1) (1  )
('2 + '1) +  ('2   '1)
: (C.15)
Recalling the denition of   '2='1, we can rewrite (C.15) as
~  2 +  (   1)
 + 1 +  (   1) : (C.16)
Obviously, since Y ?f () is dened over  2 (0; max), the maximum is actually an interior
maximum provided that ~ lies within the range of interior solutions to the investment problem,
that is, provided that parameters are such ~ < max. As shown in (C.9), ~ lies within the range
of interior solutions (0; max) provided that kmax is su¢ ciently large.
Next, consider the prot function ?f (). Using (4) and result (C.4), equilibrium prots
of the foreign rm read
?f () =
1
2
qx (1  ) ('2   '1) 
 
k?f ()

+
1
2
 (0 + sh   2sf ) : (C.17)
From (C.7), the rst derivative reads
@?f ()
@
=
1
2qx (1  ) ('2   '1) 
(1  ) (1  )
 
k?f ()

> 0
and, consequently, @2?f () =@
2 > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. From (B.18) and (C.4), the ratio k?f=k
?
p equals
k?f
k?p
=

1
2 (1  ) 
'2   '1
'2 + '1
 1
1 
:
Substituting  = ~ with ~ given by (C.15), we obtain
k?f
k?p
=

'2 + '1 +  ('2   '1)
2 ('2 + '1)
 1
1 
> 1;
so that k?f < k
?
p and x
?
f < x
?
p. The rest of the proof proceeds in three steps, concerning (i)
the ranking of relative domestic income levels, (ii) the ranking of relative foreign rms prots,
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and (iii) the fact that Partnership can be jointly optimal whereas Foreign Control with credible
repurchase and  = ~ cannot be jointly optimal.
(i) Ranking Domestic Income Levels. Under the technologies (4), the equilibrium income
levels (B.12) and (19) read
Y ?f =
1
2
h
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?f
   2r?fk?fi+ qzkmax   12 (sh +0) ; (C.18)
Y ?p =
1
2
h
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?p
   r?pk?pi+ qzkmax   12 (sh +0) : (C.19)
Taking the di¤erence, we get
Y ?p   Y ?f =
1
2
n
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?p
   r?pk?p   hqx ('2 + '1)  k?f   2r?fk?fio
where we can use (B.15) and (C.4) to eliminate the terms r?i k
?
i , obtaining
Y ?p   Y ?f =
1
2
qx 

(1  ) ('2 + '1)
 
k?p
   ('2 + '1)   ('2   '1)1  
  
k?f

: (C.20)
Substituting  = ~ with ~ given by (C.15), the term in square brackets in (C.20) reduces to
(1  ) [('2 + '1) +  ('2   '1)], and expression (C.20) becomes
Y ?p   Y ?f =
1
2
qx (1  )
n
('2 + '1)
 
k?p
   [('2 + '1) +  ('2   '1)]  k?fo : (C.21)
From (C.21), the gap Y ?p   Y ?f is positive (negative) when the term in curly brackets, or
equivalently, the logarithm of the relevant ratio,
L1 ()  ln

('2 + '1)
('2 + '1) +  ('2   '1)
 
k?p=k
?
f

; (C.22)
is positive (negative). Using (B.18) to substitute k?p and (C.4) to substitute k
?
f, expression
(C.22) becomes
L1 () = ln
(
 + 1
 + 1 +  (   1)

2 (1  )  + 1
   1
 
1 
)
;
which, substituting  = ~ with ~ given by (C.16), equals
L1

~

= ln

2
 + 1
 + 1 +  (   1)
 1
1 
: (C.23)
From (C.23), L1

~

is positive if and only if the term in square brackets exceeds unity, that
is, if and only if
5 ()    ln 2 > ln

1 +      1
 + 1

 6 () : (C.24)
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Function 5 () is an increasing straight line whereas function 6 () is increasing and concave
with
lim
!0
6 () = 0; lim
!1
6 () =1; 06 () =
   1
 + 1 +  (   1) ; (C.25)
lim
!0
06 () =
   1
 + 1
; lim
!1
06 () = 0: (C.26)
These properties imply two cases. First, if the 5 () is steeper than 6 () in  = 0, then
5 () > 6 () for all  2 (0; 1) and, hence, L1

~

> 0 for all  2 (0; 1). Formally,
if ln 2 >
   1
 + 1
then lim
!0
05 () > lim
!0
06 () and, hence, L1

~

> 0 for all  2 (0; 1) ;
which is equivalent to:
if  < 2 
1 + ln 2
1  ln 2  5:52 then Y
?
p > Y
?
f for all  2 (0; 1) : (C.27)
The second case implied by properties (C.25)-(C.26) for condition (C.24) is that, if  > 2, then
(i) 6 () is initially steeper than 5 () in  = 0, and (ii) there exists a unique nite value of
, called 2, in which 6 () cuts 5 () from above. Formally,
if  > 2 then 5 () < 6 () for  < 2 and 5 () > 6 () for  > 2; (C.28)
where the value of 2 is determined by the condition 5 (2) = 6 (2) and can be shown to be
strictly less than unity.34 Hence, result (C.28) can be equivalently restated as:
if  > 2 then there exists 2 2 (0; 1) such that

Y ?p > Y ?f for  > 2
Y ?p < Y
?
f for  < 2

:
(ii) Ranking Foreign Firms Prots. Substituting technologies (4) in (20) and (B.20), re-
spectively, equlibrium prots read
?f =
1
2

h
qx ('2   '1) 
 
k?f
   2 (1  ) r?fk?f +0 + sh   2sfi ;
?p =
1
2

h
qx ('2   '1) 
 
k?p
   r?pk?p +0 + sh   2spi :
Taking the di¤erence ?f   ?p with sf = sp and using (C.4) and (B.15) to eliminate r?fk?f
and r?pk
?
p, we obtain
?f  ?p =
1
2
 qx 
n
(1  ) ('2   '1)
 
k?f
   [('2   '1)   ('2 + '1)]  k?po : (C.29)
34The functions 5 () and 6 () exhibit the properties lim!1 5 () = ln 2 and lim!1 6 () = ln

1 +  1
+1

where 1+  1
+1
< 2 implies that 5 (1) > 6 (1). As a consequence, the intersection 2 in which 6 () cuts 5 ()
from above must be such that 2 < 1.
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Equation (C.29) already contains a critical condition on parameters: if  > '2 '1'2+'1 , the term in
square brackets is negative, implying ?f > 
?
p. We can re-write this result as
 >      1
 + 1
=) ?f > ?p: (C.30)
Restricting the attention to the case  < , result (C.29) implies that the gap ?f   ?p is
positive (negative) when the term in square brackets in (C.29), or equivalently, the logarithm
of the relevant ratio,
L2 ()  ln

(1  ) ('2   '1)
('2   '1)   ('2 + '1)
 
k?f=k
?
p

; (C.31)
is positive (negative). Using (B.18) to substitute k?p and (C.4) to substitute k
?
f, expression
(C.31) becomes
L2 () = ln
(
(1  ) ('2   '1)
('2   '1)   ('2 + '1)

1
2 (1  ) 
'2   '1
'2 + '1
 
1 
)
=
= ln
(
(1  ) (   1)
(   1)   ( + 1)

1
2 (1  ) 
   1
 + 1
 
1 
)
;
which, substituting  = ~ with ~ given by (C.16), equals
L2

~

= ln
(
   1   (   1)
   1   ( + 1)

 + 1 +  (   1)
2 ( + 1)
 
1 
)
: (C.32)
Recalling the denition of , we can rewrite (C.32) as
L2

~

= ln
8<:  1      

1 + 
2
 
1 
9=; : (C.33)
From (C.33), L2

~

is positive if and only if
7 ()  (1  ) ln

  1     

+  ln
 
1 + 

> 8 ()   ln (2) : (C.34)
Function 8 () is an increasing straight line with
08 () = ln (2) > 0: (C.35)
Function 7 (), instead, is an increasing hyperbula displaying lim!0 3 () = 0 and lim! 3 () =
+1 over the relevant range  2  0; . In particular,
07 () =
1 
  + ln

(1+)( )
 

+ 

1+
;
lim=0 
0
7 () =
1 

; lim= 
0
7 () =1:
(C.36)
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Results (C.35) and (C.36) yield a su¢ cient condition for having ?f > 
?
p. Specically, if
lim!0 07 () > 08 (), we surely obtain ?f > 
?
p because then 7 () > 8 () holds for any
 2  0; . That is:
1   >  ln (2) =) ?f > ?p for any  2
 
0; 

: (C.37)
If lim!0 07 () < 08 (), instead, there exists a region of the parameter space, (0; 3) 
 
0; 

,
such that ?f < 
?
p for  2 (0; 3) and ?f > ?p for  2
 
3;


, that is:
1   <  ln (2) =)

?f < 
?
p for  2 (0; 3) ;
?f > 
?
p for  2
 
3;


:
(C.38)
Notice that, given the denition of , we can dene a specic restriction on the parameter 
that allows us to discriminate between cases (C.37) and (C.38). Using    1+1 , the critical
inequality 1   >  ln (2) can be equivalently re-written as
 < 1 +
2
ln (2)
 3  3:88:
Hence, we have a critical threshold 3 whereby results (C.37) and (C.38) can be equivalently
restated as
 < 3 =) ?f > ?p for any  2
 
0; 

;
 > 3 =)

?f < 
?
p for  2 (0; 3) ;
?f > ?p for  2
 
3;


:
:
(C.39)
From (C.39) and (C.30), we obtain the two results concerning the foreign rms prots reported
in Proposition 5. First, the case  < 3 in (C.39) combined with (C.30) implies that if  < 3
then ?f > 
?
p for any  2 (0; 1). Second, the case  > 3 in (C.39) combined with (C.30),
implies that, if  > 3, there exists a critical level 3 2

0;  1+1

such that ?f < 
?
p when
0 <  < 3, and 
?
f > 
?
p when 3 <  < 1.
(iii) Joint optimality. Proceeding in the same way as for the proof of Proposition 2 above,
the critical loci 2 () and 3 () represented in Figure 2 are obtained by running two simple
algorithms that calculate
2 ()  arg solve f5 () = 6 (; )g ;
3 ()  arg solve f7 (; ) = 8 ()g ;
for each value of . The resulting loci are such that 3 (
0) > 2 (0) is satised for any
 2 (1;1). This implies that there is no region of the parameter space (; ) in which Y ?p < Y ?f
and ?p < 
?
f hold symultaneously. The proof that the parametrization sets

~A; ~B; ~C

are
non-empty follows immediately from Figure 2. 
Derivation of conditions (24). First, consider the upper-bound ~yf0 . From (C.18) and
(B.10), using the technologies (2) and (4) and the equilibrium conditions ri = qz, we obtain
the income gap
Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2
h
qx ('2 + '1) 
 
k?f
   2r?fk?fi  qx (1  )'1 (k?h)   12 (0   sh) ;
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where we can substitute (C.4) to eliminate r?fk
?
f, obtaining
Y ?f   Y ?h =
1
2
qx 

('2 + '1) 

1   ('2   '1)
  
k?f
   qx (1  )'1 (k?h)   12 (0   sh) :
Substituting  = ~ with ~ given by (C.15), the term in square brackets reduces to
(1  ) [('2 + '1) +  ('2   '1)]
and we obtain
Y ?f   Y ?h = qx (1  )

1
2
[('2 + '1) +  ('2   '1)]
 
k?f
   '1 (k?h)  12 (0   sh) ;
that is,
Y ?f   Y ?h = qx (1  )'1

1
2
[( + 1) +  (   1)]  k?f   (k?h)  12 (0   sh) : (C.40)
Equilibrium local k?f is given by (C.4): using  = ~ with ~ given by (C.16), we obtain
k?f

~

=

qx'1 [ + 1 +  (   1)] 
2qz
 1
1 
: (C.41)
From (C.41) and the rst expression in (B.16), we have
k?h
k?f

~
 =  2
 + 1 +  (   1)
 1
1 
: (C.42)
Using (C.42), we can rewrite (C.40) as
Y ?f Y ?h = qx (1  )'1
 
k?f
 (1
2
( + 1) +
1
2
 (   1) 

1
2
( + 1) +
1
2
 (   1)
  1
1 
)
 1
2
(0   sh) ;
and then substitute k?f by (C.41) to obtain
Y ?f   Y ?h = Q 
8<:

1
2 ( + 1) +
1
2 (   1)
	 2 
1    1
1
2 ( + 1) +
1
2 (   1)
9=;  12 (0   sh) ; (C.43)
where Q  qx (1  ) [(qx=qz) (=) ]

1  '
1
1 
1 is dened in (B.53). Result (C.43) implies that
the State prefers Foreign Control (with credible repurchase at rate  = ~) to Home Control if
and only if
0 < ~
yf
0  sh +Q 
8<:2

1
2 ( + 1) +
1
2 (   1)
	 2 
1    1
1
2 ( + 1) +
1
2 (   1)
9=; : (C.44)
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Next consider the foreign rms prots. From (C.17), the gap between the prots under Foreign
Control with credible repurchase and the reservation prot equals
?f () 0 =
1
2
qx (1  ) ('2   '1) 
 
k?f ()

+
1
2
 (sh   2sf  0) : (C.45)
With  = ~, we can substitute k?f () with (C.41), obtaining
?f () 0 =
1
2
qx (1  ) ('2   '1) 

qx'1 [ + 1 +  (   1)] 
2qz
 
1 
+
1
2
 (sh   2sf  0) ;
?f () 0 = Q  (   1)
1
2

1
2
[ + 1 +  (   1)]
 
1 
+
1
2
 (sh   2sf  0) ;
which implies that the Foreign Firm prefers Foreign Control to no initial contract, ?f > 0,
if and only if
0 < ~
f
0  sh   2sf +Q  (   1)

1
2
[ + 1 +  (   1)]
 
1 
: (C.46)
Derivation of result (25). The second inequality in (25), yp0 > 
p
0 , is already proved
in (17). The rst inequality, yp0 > ~
f
0 , is proved as follows. From (B.52) and (C.46), we have
yp0   ~f0 = 2sf +Q 
(
( + 1)
1
1    2  (   1)

1
2
( + 1) +
1
2
 (   1)
 
1 
)
: (C.47)
We now show that the term in curly brackets in (C.47) is always positive: re-writing it as a
function
9 ()  ( + 1)
1
1    2  (   1)

1
2
( + 1) +
1
2
 (   1)
 
1 
; (C.48)
the derivative with respect to  is
09 () =
1
1  
n
( + 1)

1      [( + 1) +  (   1)]

1 
o
; (C.49)
with  

1
2
 
1   + 1 +  (   1)   ( + 1)
 + 1 +  (   1) < 1: (C.50)
The sign of 09 () is positive for any  > 1. The proof is by contradiction: suppose that
09 () < 0. From (C.49)-(C.50), this would imply
 >

 + 1
 + 1 +  (   1)
 
1 
;
 + 1 +  (   1)   ( + 1)
 + 1 +  (   1) >

2   + 1
 + 1 +  (   1)
 
1 
; (C.51)
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which is absurd because the left hand side of (C.51) is less than unity whereas the right hand
side of (C.51) greater than unity.35 As a consequence,
09 () > 0 for all  > 1.
Combining this result with
lim
!1
9 () = (2)
1
1    2 > 0;
it follows that the term in curly brackets in (C.47) is positive for any value of  > 1, which
means that yp0 > ~
f
0 for any constellation of parameters.
35The fact that the right hand side of (C.51) is greater than unity can also veried by contradiction: imposing
2  +1
+1+( 1) < 1 we obtain  >
+1
 1 > 1, which is absurd because  < 1.
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Figure 3: Graphical proof of Proposition 2.
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Figure 4: Agreeability of regimes: proof of the results reported in Table 2.
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